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A PROGRESSNE CONSUMPTION TAX FOR INDNIDUALS:
AN ALTERNATNE HYBRID APPROACH
Mitchell L. Engler*

I. INTRODUCTION

There has been much recent academic and government interest in major
structural tax reform. 1 Major tax reform involves two primary issues. The
first concerns the tax base: should the U.S. shift from taxing income to a
consumption tax? 2 The second issue involves the tax rate: should one "flat"
rate apply or should higher rates apply to individuals with higher amounts
of the chosen tax base (progressive taxation)? Current deadlock exists between (i) the seriously flawed existing income tax structure3 and (ii) the
leading progressive consumption tax proposal-a cash flow tax. 4 Despite
addressing many flaws under the current structure, the cash flow approach
raises serious offsetting concerns. The unsatisfactory income tax therefore
remains in place by default. In order to break the current deadlock, I propose a new progressive consumption tax structure-a hybrid approach-to

* Associate Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University. An
earlier version of this Article was presented at the University of Pennsylvania School of Law Tax Policy
Workshop in February 2002. I am grateful for the comments from the workshop participants, especially
Michael Knoll and Reed Shuldiner. I also benefited greatly from the comments of Terrence Charvat,
Laura Cunningham, Noel Cunningham, Elia Fischer, Dan Shaviro, and Ed Zelinsky.
1.
See Edmund L. Andrews, White House Floats Idea of Dropping Income Tax, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
8, 2003, at C14; Daniel Halperin, The Randolph W. Thrower Symposium Tax Reform Perspectives:
Fundamental Tax Reform, 48 EMORY L.J. 809 (1999); John K. McNulty, Flat Tax, Consumption Tax,
Consumption-Type Income Tax Proposals in the United States: A Tax Policy Discussion of Fundamental
Tax Reform, 88 CAL. L. REv. 2095 (2000); Richard W. Stevenson, Bush Takes Aim at Tax Reform, N.Y.
TIMES, July 16, 2001, at Al, reprinted in 92 TAX NOTES 935 (Aug. 13, 2001).
2.
This concerns the federal government's primary tax revenue source. Less significant amounts of
revenue are raised from taxes other than the current income tax regime (for example, excise taxes).
WILLIAM A. KLEIN, JOSEPH BANKMAN, & DANIEL N. SHAVIRO, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 1 (12th
ed. 2000). There also has been some recent scholarly interest in a wealth tax base. E.g., Deborah H.
Schenk, F'oreword to Symposium on Wealth Taxes, 53 TAX L. REV. 257 (2000). Nonetheless, the income
and consumption bases remain the two primary choices under current consideration as annual taxing
regimes. See KLEIN ET AL., supra, at 8, 15.
3.
The current structure has some consumption tax features. See infra notes 100, 102 and accompanying text for a discussion of retirement savings. The system, therefore, has been called a hybrid
income/consumption tax. See UNEASY COMPROMISE: PROBLEMS OF A HYBRID INCOME-CONSUMPTION
TAX (Henry J. Aaron, Harvey Galper et al. eds., 1988). Consistent with its more common characterization, the current structure is referred to as an income tax.
4.
Despite receiving some support, a flat consumption tax is unlikely to generate a consensus due
to distributional concerns. See infra notes 64, 67 and accompanying text.
1205

1206

Alabama Law Review

[Vol. 54:4:1205

substantially improve upon current law and existing consumption tax proposals.
The two components of the new hybrid structure achieve this significant
advancement. First, consistent with the current income tax structure; wages
generally would be taxed even if saved for future consumption. As discussed below, this wage component addresses the most serious concerns
under the cash flow tax. Second, the hybrid approach would tax the excess
of (i) savings withdrawals for consumption, over (ii) previously saved
wages, increased by the risk-free interest return thereon. The structure of
this non-wage component eliminates the most serious problems under the
current income tax. The hybrid approach therefore captures the benefits of
consumption taxation without the disabling problems of the cash flow tax.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part II briefly illustrates the basic differences among the income tax, the cash flow (consumption) tax, and the
hybrid (consumption) approach. Part III explains why academics and government officials should reach a consensus to replace the current income tax
with a progressive consumption tax. Part III first focuses on the serious
practical shortcomings in income taxation, primarily related to the reporting
of income and losses when "realized" through a sale or exchange. As shown
therein, realization-based problems seriously distort the desired allocation of
the income tax burden. In favorable contrast, both consumption tax alternatives-the cash flow tax and the hybrid approach-eliminate the most serious realization-based problems. As further discussed in Part III, these practical income tax problems combine with two theoretical points to establish a
strong threshold case for consumption taxation. First, prior scholarship has
shown, ignoring practical distortions, that taxing consumption rather than
income does not substantially alter the relative tax burdens among individuals. Second, prior scholarship is inconclusive as to whether an income or
consumption tax base is preferable in theory.
Notwithstanding this strong threshold case, a consensus has yet to form
around progressive consumption taxation. Part IV explains this result by
recapping the serious problems raised by prior commentary on the cash flow
tax, the leading progressive consumption proposal. Part IV exhibits how the
cash flow taxation problems primarily relate to the absence of tax collections on saved wages. Specifically, the lack of current tax on saved wages
raises tax avoidance, transition, and revenue concerns. In addition, a progressive cash flow tax could impact savings decisions in undesirable ways
due to the multiple tax rates. 5 These problems have made the move to a consumption tax less attractive. As demonstrated in Part IV, however, the wage
component of the hybrid approach favorably addresses each of these cash
flow tax concerns. Part IV also evaluates why the consensus for a progressive consumption tax should finally emerge under the hybrid approach.
5.
Under the cash flow tax, saved wages are generally taxed in the year of consumption rather than
in the year earned. Thus, there would be a tax impact on savings where the consumption-year tax rate
differs from the wage-year tax rate.
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II. BASIC DIFFERENCES AMONG THE INCOME TAX,
THE CASH FLOW TAX, AND THE HYBRID APPROACH

This Part contrasts the basic workings of the income tax, the cash flow
tax, and the new hybrid approach. The basic differences among the three
taxes is illustrated in the following example.
Example 1: Treceives a $100,000 cash salary on 12/31/01. Tinvests
all after-tax wages in a one-year U.S. Treasury note paying the ten
percent risk-free rate. T consumes all after-tax proceeds on
12/31/02. The tax rate is a flat fifty percent.

A. The Current Income Tax

Under the present income tax, income receipts are taxed even if saved.6
T therefore owes $50,000 tax in year 01 on the $100,000 wages. 7 The remaining after-tax wages are used to purchase a $50,000 treasury note on
12/31/01. T receives $55,000 upon maturity of the note on 12/31/02.8 T
owes $2,500 tax on the $5,000 of interest income in year 02, leaving
$52,500 of after.:.tax consumption.9
B. The Cash Flow Tax

The cash flow tax makes two primary adjustments to the income tax
base: (i) an unlimited deduction for savings/investment and (ii) the inclusion
of savings/investment withdrawals. 10 These adjustments convert the income
tax base into a consumption tax base. As discussed in greater detail below,
this Subpart presents the cash flow tax as the leading existing consumption
tax proposal due to the desire for progressive tax rates. Unlike other consumption tax models such as the retail sales tax, the cash flow tax can apply
higher rates to individuals with higher consumption levels. 11

6.
As discussed in Subpart III.A, income can be defined as the sum of consumption plus change in
wealth for the relevant tax period, typically one year. Under current law, there is a limited exception for
qualified retirement savings. See infra note 102 and accompanying text.
7.
$50,000 tax= 50% tax rate x $100,000 wages.
8.
$50,000 principal plus $5000 interest (10% x $50,000).
9.
T's investment gain equals the $55,000 investment proceeds less the $50,000 purchase price.
Tax for year 02 = 50% x $5000. Investment proceeds of $55,000 less $2500 tax = $52,500 of after-tax
consumption.
10.
Generally, borrowed funds also increase the cash flow tax base, while debt repayments reduce
the tax base. See infra notes 110-13 and accompanying text for a discussion of a limited exception.
11.
Under a retail sales tax, businesses collect tax on their sales. As discussed in Subpart IV.A, this
prevents the application of progressive rates based on each individual consumer's collective consumption for the year. While Example 1 uses a flat tax rate, this assumption was made to focus initially on
issues other than progressivity. See, e.g., Example 6 in Subpart IV.A (which discusses progressivity
issues).
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Under the cash flow tax, T owes zero tax in year 01 since T saves the
entire wages (i.e., T consumes nothing). 12 T therefore purchases a $100,000
treasury note on 12/31/01. Treceives $110,000 upon maturity of the note on
12/31/02. Because T will consume the proceeds on 12/31/02, the full
$110,000 is included in the year 02 tax base. 13 T pays $55,000 tax, leaving
$55,000 of after-tax consumption. 14
C. The Hybrid Approach
The hybrid approach has two components: a current wage tax and an
adjusted cash flow tax on consumption. The wage component would tax
earned income regardless of whether saved or consumed. 15 The adjusted
cash flow component would tax the excess of (i) the current year's consumption, determined as above under the cash flow tax, over (ii) current
wages. Prior years' saved wages, plus the risk-free return thereon, would be
deductible under this adjusted cash flow component (to the extent not previously utilized). A general "basis offset account" would track this carryforward amount from year to year on the tax return.
The basic workings of the hybrid approach are illustrated in Example 1;
more detailed examples are discussed below in Part IV. T owes $50,000 tax
in year 01 under the wage tax component. T therefore purchases a $50,000
treasury note. Like the income tax, T receives $55,000 upon maturity of the
note on 12/31/02. Unlike the income tax, however, T does not owe any additional tax in year 02. T's $55,000 basis offset account fully offsets the
inclusion of the $55,000 investment proceeds under the adjusted cash flow
component. The basis-offset account equals $55,000 as of year 02 since (i)
T saved $50,000 of after-tax wages in year 01, and (ii) the risk-free rate was
ten percerit for the one-year saving period. 16 T can consume $55,000 in year
02 (i.e., the full pretax proceeds from the treasury note), thereby matching
the after-tax consumption under the cash flow tax.

12.
Technically, the wages are included in the cash flow base while T's saving's deduction fully
offsets the wages.
13.
As discussed above, savings withdrawals increase the cash flow base. T will consume less than
$110,000 after paying taxes. However, this is irrelevant for the tax base definition. The same result
generally can be obtained regardless of whether taxes are included in the tax base; only the stated tax
rate is impacted. For instance, a fifty percent "tax-inclusive" rate on the full pretax amount (i.e., no
deduction for taxes paid) can be expressed as an equivalent 100% "tax-exclusive" rate (i.e., imposed on
consumption less taxes). On the above example, applying the fifty percent tax inclusive rate to the full
$110,000 leaves T with consumption of $55,000. Applying the higher 100% tax exclusive rate leaves the
same result (T can consume only $55,000 because that amount generates a tax liability of $55,000). The
tax exclusive rate (E) is derived from the tax inclusive rate (n under the formula E = J/(1 - I). On the
above numbers, 1.0 = .50/[1 - .50]. As another example, a twenty percent tax inclusive rate can be expressed as a twenty-five percent tax exclusive rate. E = .20/(1 - .20) = .25.
14.
$55,000 tax = 50% x $110,000. After-tax consumption = $110,000 investment proceeds $55,000 tax.
15.
The hybrid approach could continue the current limited exception for qualified retirement savings. See infra note 102 and accompanying text.
16.
As discussed above, the basis offset account equals saved wages plus the risk-free return
thereon. $50,000 x 1.1 = $55,000.
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In sum, the hybrid approach differs from the cash flow tax in two major
ways. First, the hybrid approach blocks the use of new savings deductions
against wages. New savings are deductible under the hybrid approach, but
only against non-wage consumption (i.e., current consumption in excess of
current wages). 17 Similar to the cash flow tax (and the income tax), however, deductions other than new savings could offset wages. 18
The second difference under the hybrid approach concerns its future allowance for the savings deductions blocked by the wage restriction. Under
the hybrid approach, these savings deductions carry forward indefinitely to
subsequent years, with interest, for use against subsequent non-wage consumption. The carry-forward deduction for previously saved wages avoids
double taxation of such savings (once when earned under the wage component, again when withdrawn for consumption). The additional exemption
for the risk-free interest return on saved wages preserves the hybrid approach's status as a consumption tax; i.e., the interest adjustment compensates taxpayers for the earlier taxation of saved wages relative to the cash
flow tax. 19 The hybrid approach, therefore, is a consumption tax in a meaningful sense even though it does not strictly tax consumption; the tax on
saved wages, with the subsequent exemption for such savings plus interest,
can be viewed as an advance collection system. 20 Example 1 evidences this
understanding, as T had equal results under the hybrid approach and the

17.
Debt repayments also are deductible only against non-wage consumption in order to prevent
taxpayers from avoiding the limitation. For instance, assume T wants to save all of his year 01 wages. T
cannot avoid current tax on the wages by saving the $100,000, because the savings deduction cannot
offset wages. T could dodge this limit if interest repayments were deductible against wages. Assume T
borrows $1,000,000 on 1/1/01 at ten percent, agreeing to repay $1,100,000 on 12/31/01. T invests the
$1,000,000 in a savings asset that grows in value to $1,100,000 as of 12/31/01. T sells the savings asset
to repay the loan. The leveraged investment converts the original savings deduction to a debt repayment
since (i) net savings were reduced to zero ($1,100,000 dissaving from the 12/31 sale of the savings asset
less the sum of the original $100,000 savings from the wages plus $1,000,000 of additional savings from
the loan proceeds) and (ii) a net debt repayment of $100,000 was generated ($1,100,000 debt repayment
on 12/31 less $1,000,000 loan proceeds on 1/1).
18.
In theory, the hybrid (consumption) approach, like the cash flow (consumption) tax, allows
deductions for the costs of generating wages but not for personal consumption expenditures. However, a
similar inquiry arises under the income tax. See, for example, discussion in Subpart ill.A defining income as the sum of consumption plus change in wealth. Therefore, the hybrid approach or the cash flow
approach follows current law on (i) mixed work/consumption items like child-care expenses, commuting
costs, and so forth and (ii) non-work related items such as charitable contributions. Without necessarily
endorsing the current treatment of any such item, this assumption recognizes that these issues generally
do not distinguish the hybrid approach, the income tax, or the cash flow tax. The propriety of the current
treatment of such items is beyond the scope of this Article. A similar point can be made about investment-related expenses and other items receiving preferential treatment under current law, for example,
life insurance. Current law provides cash flow treatment for a limited amount of qualified retirement
savings and is continued under the hybrid approach. See infra note 102 and accompanying text.
19.
That is, the cash flow tax defers the tax on saved wages until consumption. Part ill provides an
alternative way to understand this risk-free adjustment. As discussed therein, the income tax imposes an
excess burden on the risk-free return to savings, relative to the consumption tax. A current tax on saved
wages, typically viewed as an income tax feature, can be converted to a consumption tax equivalent
through an exemption of the risk-free return on after-tax savings. However, see infra notes 164-71 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the possible understatement of the risk-free rate.
20.
In addition to this advance collection feature, the hybrid approach applies progressivity differently than the cash flow tax. See discussion at Subparts IV.A and IV.D.1.
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cash flow tax. Further analysis of risky returns in Subpart N .D below provides additional conceptual support.2 1
Ill. CONSENSUS IN FAVOR OF THE CONSUMPTION TAX

This Part discusses the consensus potential of a progressive consumption tax. Subpart III.A focuses on the practical reasons supporting this conclusion. Income taxation raises serious practical distortions due to its reporting of income and loss only when "realized" through a sale or exchange. In
favorable contrast, both con~umption tax alternatives-the cash flow tax
and the hybrid approach-largely eliminate these distortions. Subpart III.B
supplements this rejection of the income tax on practical grounds with two
theoretical points. First, recent scholarship shows a relatively narrow difference in theory between individuals' relative tax burdens under a consumption tax and an income tax. Subpart III.B also takes notice of the reasonable
disagreement between serious tax scholars as to the merits of taxing income
versus consumption.
A. Income Tax's Long-Standing Practical Problems

In theory, an income tax base generally should include the sum of consumption plus change in wealth for the tax period, typically one year. 22 Under such an accretion concept, items of gain or loss should be reported in the
year of accrual. For the reasons developed below, any net increase in the
value of a taxpayer's assets during the year should be taxed, even if not yet
converted to cash. 23
In practice, however, the income tax has never implemented such accretion or "mark-to-market" treatment. 24 Such failure is attributed primarily to
the practical difficulties in valuing all assets each year. Additionally, liquidity concerns have been prominent.25 Instead, income generally is included
21.
See, e.g., Example 7 in Subpart IV.D.
22.
Most tax scholars agree that this is the theoretically correct income tax base. E.g., DAVID F.
BRADFORD, UNTANGLING THE INCOME TAX 15-19 (1986). This is often referred to as the "HaigSimons" tax base. ROBERT M. HAIG, THE CONCEPT OF INCOME-ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ASPECTS, IN
THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 1, 7 (Robert M. Haig ed. 1921); HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME
TAXATION 50 (1938); see also infra note 23 (explaining why the Haig-Simons formulation is, in theory,
the preferred income tax base).
23.
The discussion below provides several perspectives for understanding why a viable income tax
system requires the accretion concept. At the more basic level, an income tax that includes gain only
upon sale raises a host of intractable problems. For example, see the discussion throughout Subpart
ID.A. At a deeper level, as discussed in Subpart ID.B, an income tax imposes an excess burden on the
risk-free component of the return to savings. However, such a risk-free burden is imposed inequitably
unless all gains are taxed in the year of accrual. See infra note 205.
24.
The current Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.) utilizes mark-to-market treatment, but only in very
limited circumstances. See I.R.C. § 475 (2002) (securities dealers); id. § 1256 (futures contracts). A
more universal accretion regime has proven elusive despite the efforts of numerous scholars. Edward A.
Zelinsky, For Realization: Income Taxation, Sectoral Accretionism and the Virtue of Attainable Virtues,
19 CARDOZO L. REV. 861 (1997).
25.
See TREASURY DEP'T, BLUEPRINTS FOR BASIC TAX REFORM 81 (1977) [hereinafter
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under current law only when "realized" through a market transaction, for
example, a sale or exchange. Notwithstanding compelling reasons to reject
an accretion income tax, 26 the realization requirement raises several serious
problems. Realization allows certain taxpayers to defer their taxes, generally
without any interest charge. 27 Under time value of money principles, such
taxpayers reduce their tax burdens relative to others. 28
Example 2 below evidences one particular concern. Taxpayers who defer realization until consumption effectively receive consumption tax treatment. This is problematic because, inter alia, not all taxpayers have equal
opportunities to defer realization until consumption. 29 Thus, shifting to a
consumption tax would level the playing field for those less able to defer
realization until consumption.
Furthermore, Example 3 below demonstrates a more dramatic problem.
The realization requirement also allows some taxpayers to delay paying
taxes until after consumption. This results when a taxpayer holds investments with offsetting gain(s) and loss(es). There is no net economic loss to
the extent gain on the appreciated investment(s) offsets the loss investment(s). Nonetheless, such taxpayer can generate a current tax loss by selectively selling only the loss investment (and reinvesting the proceeds). This
allows consumption without current tax where the tax loss is deductible
against the income receipts funding consumption. 30
The following examples illustrate these problems. To highlight the areas
of exposure, these examples assume in the first instance the lack of any

BLUEPRINTS]. Liquidity concerns arise since taxpayers would have to pay tax even though they have not
yet converted their appreciated asset(s) to cash.
26.
In addition to the stated valuation and liquidity concerns, taxpayer compliance may be undermined. The average taxpayer might have difficulty in understanding and accepting a tax on "paper
gains." Zelinsky, supra note 24, at 893-901. But see David Shakow, Taxation without Realization: A
Proposal for Accrual Taxation, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1111 (1986) (concluding that the obstacles to accrual
taxation largely are surmountable).
27.
While current law occasionally imposes an interest charge, a more universal interest charge is
hampered by the same key practical problem underlying the realization requirement. Charging interest
for the deferral period requires knowledge of when the gain accrued; determining the timing of gain
accrual requires annual valuation. For a more detailed discussion, see Mitchell L. Engler, Partial Basis
Indexation: An Implicit Response to Tax Deferral, 53 TAXL. REv. 177, 180-82 (2000).
28.
Under time value of money principles, deferring a $ 100 tax liability reduces the current cost
below $100 if the government does not charge interest on the deferred tax liability. Where interest is not
imposed, an amount less than $100 can be set aside today to satisfy the future $100 liability (since the
lesser amount can be invested and earn interest).
29.
Thus, those fortunate enough to defer realization until consumption have relatively lower burdens than those who realize income before consumption. See infra note 32 and accompanying text for a
discussion of possible deferral opportunities on earned income. On the other hand, if all taxpayers could
defer tax until consumption with proper tax planning, choosing an income tax over a consumption tax
would be merely a trap for the unwary. The undertaking of transactions solely to avoid tax also raises
efficiency issues.
30.
As shown in Example 3, this defers the tax without necessarily eliminating it. The taxpayer
continues to hold assets with unrealized gain (i.e., an imbedded tax liability). A sale of such appreciated
assets would trigger the deferred tax. Nonetheless, the taxpayer has reduced his tax liability through the
interest-free deferral beyond consumption. In addition, see infra note 118 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the possibility that the tax liability would be eliminated by virtue of the taxpayer's insolvency.
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government responses. The impacts of protective provisions are addressed
after Example 4.
Example 2: Realization Income Tax as a Consumption Tax-T performs services in year 01 for his wholly owned business. The services increase the value of the business by $100,000 as of 12/31/01
(i.e., matching T's labor income in Example 1). Rather than drawing a salary, T retains such $100,000 value in the business, hoping
to receive a positive return on the new capital value during year 02.
The value of the business increases by $10,000 in year 02 (matching the ten percent return on the treasury note investment in Example 1). T realizes all value by selling the business for $110,000 on
12/31/02. T consumes all after-tax proceeds on 12/31/02.

Under the realization income tax, T owes no tax in year 01 because he
has not realized his labor income. 31 This allows continued investment of the
full $100,000 value in the business. T realizes $110,000 of income in year
02 upon the sale of the business. T pays $55,000 tax in 02, leaving $55,000
for consumption. Recall the results of Example 1 where T similarly performed $100,000 of services in year 01 and received a ten percent investment return for year 02. T's after-tax consumption was $55,000 under the
consumption tax, but only $52,500 under the income tax. In Example 2, T's
results under the realization income tax therefore match the consumption
tax.32
Example 3-Consumption without Current Tax: assume the same
facts as Example 2 except T also holds two offsetting investments.
Investment #1 is worth $110,000 more than its purchase price; investment #2 is worth $110,000 less than its original cost. T sells investment #2 on 12/31/02, immediately reinvesting the proceeds.

Despite selling his business to fund consumption in year 02, T owes no
tax that year since the $110,000 realized loss on investment #2 offsets the
$110,000 business sale gain. 33 T has $110,000 of after-tax proceeds available for consumption in year 02. The tax has not been completely avoided
since a sale of the appreciated investment #1 in the future would trigger tax
31.
Assume the business itself did not realize any income by selling products or other transactions.
Rather, the increase in value was reflected in the appreciation of business assets, including possibly
goodwill.
32.
This example illustrates deferral of only labor income since the investment return was realized
in the year of accrual. A similar concern arises where investment return is not realized in the year of
accrual (for example, the taxpayer holds appreciated investment assets at year-endr
In addition to this example's specific factual situation, a realization income tax provides taxpayers
other opportunities to defer tax on their labor income until consumption. See infra note 105; see also
infra note 42.
33.
Under the realization requirement, the excess of purchase price over sales proceeds constitutes a
tax loss.
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on the investment gain. Nonetheless, the interest-free deferral of the
$55,000 tax liability until after consumption reduces its true cost. 34
Finally, the capital gains preference presents a related realization problem. Realization creates a lock-in scenario for taxpayers who would like to
shift their savings from an appreciated asset to a new investment. There is a
tax incentive to maintain the current investment: continued interest-free
deferral of the tax on the gain. Prior commentary shows that such lock-in
arguably supports a lower capital gains rate for investment assets under the
income tax; i.e., a lower rate reduces the tax incentive to retain appreciated
assets. 35 However, the lower capital gains rate under current law generates
other serious distortions. The following example illustrates these concerns.
Example 4: assume the same facts as Example 2 except (i) a twentyfive percent capital gains rate applies to all investment returns, (ii) T
sells his business for its $100,000 value on 12/31/01 (to isolate the
preference issue by removing any deferral benefit), and (iii) T reinvests the sales proceeds from the business in a ten percent treasury
note like Example 1.

Despite realizing the full $100,000 income in year 01, T's after-tax consumption increases relative to the consumption tax. T's after-tax funds on
12/31/01 are $75,000 since the $100,000 labor income is taxed at the
twenty-five percent capital gains rate. The labor income was reported as
investment gain since it was realized from the sale of the business. T purchases a $75,000 treasury note, which pays $82,500 on 12/31/02.36 T owes
$1875 tax on the $7500 of investment return, leaving $80,625 of after-tax
consumption. 37
A realization income tax could, and the current law does, attempt to
protect against these realization shortcomings. 38 Such current protections
34.
It is also possible that the taxpayer ultimately will not pay the $55,000 tax liability. This could
occur where the taxpayer does not have enough assets to repay the deferred tax when the appreciated
asset is sold. The problem arises where the taxpayer's portfolio is funded with obligations owed to other
parties. If so, outside lenders might have priority over the government on the sales proceeds. Thus, the
government will collect only if T has other assets remaining in the year of sale. See infra note 118 and
accompanying text. Independently, complete tax avoidance also is possible under current law due to the
"basis step-up" rule at death (eliminating built-in investment gains at death). I.RC. § 1014 (2002).
35.
From a fairness perspective, earlier tax collections at a lower rate might be preferable to waiting
for a possible later collection at a higher rate. See Noel B. Cunningham & Deborah H. Schenk, The Case
for a Capital Gains Preference, 48 TAX L. REV. 319, 321 (1993); Daniel N. Shaviro, Commentary,
Uneasiness and Capital Gains, 48 TAX L. REV. 393, 396, 417 (1993). See infra note 52 and accompanying text (offering another justification for the capital gains preference under the income tax and why
consumption taxes generally remove such justifications).
36.
$75,000 X J.J.
37.
Tax= .25 x $7500 = $1875. $82,500 investment proceeds less $1875 tax= $80,625. This assumes that the interest income qualifies for the lower capital gains rate. As discussed infra note 40 and
accompanying text, interest does not qualify for the lower rate under current law. Even with the interest
taxed at the regular rates, T's position is still improved relative to the consumption tax. In addition, as
discussed at Subpart N.E, some taxpayers attempt, under current law, to convert interest returns to
capital gains.
38.
Consider also the income tax's long-standing failure to reduce nominal gains by the inflationary
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include: (i) the government's ability to impute salary income to business
owners in the absence of adequate compensation payments, (ii) a one-year
holding requirement for the favorable capital gains rates, 39 (iii) the denial of
the capital gains rate for interest income,40 and (iv) limitations on the ability
to use investment losses. 41 Serious concerns nonetheless remain for several
reasons.
First, given the inevitable gaps in coverage, the tax avoidance possibilities suggested above remain ready for exploitation (i.e., deferral of labor
income and/or investment return, conversion of labor income and/or interest
income to capital gains). 42 fu this regard, each example showed the income
tax's shortcomings in isolation (for example, either deferral or the preferential rate, but not both together). Even assuming partial blockage of each
strategy, taxpayers can link the remaining availability of the different strategies.43 As a related distributional point, the wealthy tend to disproportioncomponent. While marginal rate brackets are increased for inflation, this is conceptually distinct from
the failure to reduce nominal gain for inflation. See Reed Shuldiner, Indexing the Tax Code, 48 TAX L.
REV. 537, 542-45 (1993). Such over-taxation does not raise direct tax avoidance concerns. Nonetheless,
this is another income tax weakness since the tax burden unfairly varies with the amount of inflation. See
Noel B. Cunningham, The Taxation of Capital Income and the Choice of Tax Base, 52 TAXL. REV. 17,
39-43 (1996). In addition, such shortcoming might raise indirect tax avoidance concerns by allowing an
argument by capital gains proponents that a lower rate is needed to offset the excess inclusion of the full
nominal gain. See Cunningham & Schenk, supra note 35, at 337 ("[O]ne of the principal arguments used
to support the preference is that capital gains are largely inflationary."). However, a lower capital gains
rate is a poor offset to the taxation of inflationary gain. Id. at 338-41. Similarly, the excess inclusion of
the full nominal gain arguably offsets tax deferral under the realization requirement. Taxation of nominal
gain is also a poor offset to realization deferral. See Engler, supra note 27, at 198-99 n.115.
39.
I.R.C. §§ l(h)(l), 1222 (2002).
40.
Id. § 1222 (requiring gain from sale or exchange); see also id. § 1271 (treating certain income
from debt instruments-including payments on sale or exchange-as ordinary income, rather than longterm capital gain).
41.
There are several limits on realized losses. First, realized capital losses generally are deductible
only against capital gains plus $3,000 of ordinary income each year. Id. § 1211(b). Second, I.R.C. §
1091 "wash sale" rules disallow losses on the sale of stock/securities where substantially identical
stock/securities are purchased within thirty days of the Joss sale date (backwards or forwards). I.R.C. §
1091 (2002). Third, I.R.C. § 1092 "straddle" rules defer realized losses to the extent the taxpayer holds
"offsetting positions" with matching amount of unrealized gain. Id. § 1092. An "offsetting position"
exists under § 1092(c)(2)(A) "if there is a substantial diminution of the taxpayer's risk of loss [on the
asset sold for a loss]." Id.§ 1092(c)(2)(A).
42.
For instance, salary imputation requires enforcement resources by the Internal Revenue Service
and is further hampered by the difficulty in ascertaining the true labor component in the absence of a
market transaction. In this regard, note the difficulty even in theory, let alone practice, of separating the
labor component from capital component in the development of a patent etc. See infra note 157 and
accompanying text. In addition, sophisticated taxpayers might use leveraged acquisitions to convert
labor income to investment return potentially (i) receiving preference rates and/or (ii) skirting limits on
offsetting labor income with selectively realized losses. Mitchell L. Engler, Partial Basis Indexation:
Tax Arbitrage and Related Issues, 55 TAX L. REV. 69, 93-104 (2001); Shuldiner, supra note 38, at 646.
Taxpayers similarly might avoid the straddle rules by investing in comparable companies. See Daniel
Shaviro, Risk-Based Rules and the Taxation of Capital Income, 50 TAX L. REV. 643, 665-68 (1995).
43.
For instance, assume the same key underlying facts as the prior examples: (i) T earns a $100,000
salary in year 01 and (ii) all (after-tax) earnings as of 12/31/01 generate a ten percent return for the oneyear investment period. Also assume Example S's twenty-five percent capital gains rate and that T realizes his ten percent investment return as capital gains rather than interest income. Finally, assume T can
defer only half of his earned income from year O1 to 02 and that only true investment return qualifies for
the twenty-five percent rate. T owes $25,000 tax in year 01 (50% x $50,000 wages), leaving $75,000 for
investment as of 12/31/01. The invested $75,000 grows to $82,500 ($75,000 x 1.1) as of 12/31/02. T
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ately benefit from these shortcomings. 44 Second, "non-abusive" transactions
still can benefit from the lower tax burden.45 Third, the protective provisions
add significant complexity and require enforcement resources. 46 Finally, the
protections often are too broad, unfairly overtaxing certain taxpayers. 47 In
sum, the realization requirement has been called the Achilles heel of the
income tax for excellent reasons. 48
In favorable contrast, the hybrid approach and the cash flow tax generally eliminate the realization-based problems.49 First, consider Example 2
where T deferred his earned income from year 0 1 to year 02. Compare T to
other taxpayers who similarly earn $100,000 of labor income in year 01 and
defer consumption for one year at the ten percent risk-free rate. Under the
realization income tax, those capable of utilizing the deferral strategy have
after-tax consumption of $55,000 while those unable to defer realization
consume only $52,500. In favorable contrast, all such similarly situated
taxpayers would have $55,000 of consumption under the hybrid approach or
the cash flow tax. 50
owes additional tax of (i) $25,000 on the $50,000 of deferred wages, and (ii) $1,875 on the $7,500 true
investment return [25% x ($82,500 - $75,000)]. This leaves T with $55,625 of consumption (and no
further tax liability), more than the $55,000 under either of the two consumption tax alternatives. T came
out ahead of the consumption tax even though: (i) realization was deferred on only half the labor income
and (ii) no labor income qualified for the capital gains rates. The results would be more dramatic if T
received a higher risky investment return on invested capital.
More generally, aggressive taxpayers attempt to skirt the protective provisions. For instance, a successful "conversion" of ordinary income to capital gains through a conversion transaction provides two
potential benefits: (i) taxation of the ordinary income at the lower capital gains rate and/or (ii) the ability
to offset such ordinary income with realized capital losses (thereby avoiding the general prohibition on
using capital losses against ordinary income). See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
44.
See George R. Zodrow & Charles E. McLure, Jr., Implementing Direct Consumption Taxes in
Developing Countries, 46 TAX L. REV. 405, 436 (1991) ("[I]ncome taxes in practice are commonly
replete with tax preferences for capital income that are of little benefit to the average taxpayer, but enable the wealthy to lower their tax burdens dramatically.").
45.
For example, gain on a long-term stock investment receives the dual benefit of deferral and the
lower capital gains rate.
46.
Shuldiner, supra note 38, at 646; Michael S. Knoll, Financial Innovation, Tax Arbitrage, and
Retrospective Taxation: The Problem with Passive Government Lending, 52 TAX L. REV. 199, 201-02
(1997).
47.
Consider, for example, the I.R.C. rule limiting investment losses to only $3000 of earned income. I.R.C. § 121l(b) (2002). Consider a taxpayer who earns $100,000 salary and sells his only investment for a $100,000 loss. Although the taxpayer has true net income of $0, he reports $97,000 of net
income due to the loss limitation rule. While the $97,000 unused loss carries forward for use in subsequent years, the taxpayer is not fully compensated under time value of money principles since the loss is
not adjusted for interest.
48.
WILLIAM T. ANDREWS, The Achilles Heel of the Comprehensive Income Tax, in NEW
DIRECTIONS IN FEDERAL TAX POLICY FOR THE 1980s, at 278, 280-85 (Charles E. Walker & Mark A.
Bloomfield eds., 1983).
49.
See Knoll, supra note 46, at 207 n.49, 220 n.84 (discussing the cash flow consumption tax). See
infra note 118 and accompanying text (discussing a related, but more narrow problem under the consumption taxes); see also infra notes 104-05 and accompanying text (regarding imprecision due to progressive tax rates which cannot be completely eliminated under an income or consumption tax).
50.
Please see calculations above for each approach in Example 1 and see Part IV for possible
divergences between the two consumption tax approaches where progressive rates and/or risky returns
apply. See Mitchell L. Engler & Michael S. Knoll, Simplifying the Transition to a (Progressive) Consumption Tax, 56 SMU L. REV. 53, 66-68 (2003) (offering an explanation of why the consumption taxes
generally eliminate the time value of money significance of realization and how consumption taxes
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Consider next Example 3 where T sold only his losing investment. This
selective loss strategy increased T's after-tax consumption to more than
$55,000 under the realization income tax. In favorable contrast again, such
sale would not generate any tax loss under either the hybrid approach or the
cash flow tax.51 Both taxes therefore eliminate this selective loss concern.
Finally, recall the capital gains problems evidenced by Example 4. Recall
how the lock-in problem under the realization income tax arguably supports
the capital gains preference as a "second-best" response. The two consumption taxes eliminate the potential second-best arguments favoring a capital
gains preference. In particular, selling appreciated assets for reinvestment
generally would no longer generate any tax liability. 52 Thus, the capital
gains preference has no place under the hybrid approach or the cash flow
tax. Accordingly, both forms of consumption taxation should remove the
problems raised by Example 4.
B. Supplementary Theoretic Support for Replacing the Income Tax

The merits of taxing income versus consumption have been debated for
a long time. The traditional concepts of the income and consumption taxes
initially suggested a very significant difference between the two taxes, in
theory. Traditionally, the income tax was distinguished from the consumption tax through its "double taxation of saving."53 This label follows from
Example 1 above where the saved wages were taxed initially upon receipt
and a subsequent tax was imposed on the investment return as well. In contrast, the conventional cash flow consumption tax imposes only a single tax
(upon consumption). The "double taxation of savings" label suggests that
the income tax imposes an excess burden on all investment return. Assuming the desirability of taxing investment return, such a significant difference
between the two taxes might sustain the income tax despite its serious implementation flaws discussed above. More recent scholarship demonstrates,
maintain a present value equivalency of tax burdens under certain assumptions).
51.
Under both taxes, the sale of a loss asset would generate an increase to the tax base if the sales
proceeds were used for consumption. There generally would not be any increase or decrease if the sales
proceeds were reinvested; the inclusion of the sales proceeds would be offset by a new savings deduction. If anything, a sale for reinvestment could increase the base (reinvestment in a consumer durable).
See infra note 111 and accompanying text.
52.
Under both taxes the inclusion of the sales proceeds generally would be offset by new savings
deductions. A limited exception might arise upon certain reinvestments in consumer durable. This does
not alter the textual conclusion since, inter alia, either consumption tax version generally would eliminate the current time value of money benefit from deferral. See infra note 111 and accompanying text. In
addition, continuation of the current exclusion for some gain on a home sale, see I.R.C. § 121 (2002),
would limit situations where a sale/repurchase could trigger gain. Similarly, consumer durable gain more
generally could be deferred if reinvested in another durable (through a basis carryover regime).
The inflationary justification also is neutered since the two consumption taxes exempt the entire
risk-free return, and not just the inflationary component. See supra note 38 and accompanying text
(discussing inflationary justification); supra note 19 and accompanying text (discussing risk-free exemption under the consumption taxes).
53.
See, e.g., RICHARD GOODE, THE INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX 25-26 (1976) (discussing the fairness
of the income tax's "double taxation of savings").
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however, that a theoretic income tax imposes a much more limited excess
burden on investment return. In particular, the income tax, in theory, generally imposes an excess tax burden only on the real risk-free rate of return. 54
The following example illustrates this point.
Example 5: assume the same facts as Example 1 except, under the
cash flow tax, T invests $50,000 of the salary in a risky stock (the
other halfremains invested in the treasury note). The stock doubles
in value as of 12/31/02.

Under the cash flow tax, T would have $155,000 of pretax proceeds as
of 12/31/02: (i) $100,000 stock proceeds and (ii) $55,000 from the treasury
note. This allows $77,500 of after-tax consumption. 55 Assume T invests the
full $50,000 of after-tax wages under the income tax in the risky stock: i.e.,
matching his risk tolerance under the cash flow tax. T would have after-tax
proceeds of $75,000: $100,000 pretax proceeds less tax on the $50,000
gain. 56 Despite the "double taxation of savings," T's reduced consumption
of $2,500 under the income tax e~uals the tax rate times only the risk-free
return on the $50,000 investment. 7 Historically, the real risk-free rate has
been a very small component of investment return, with the short-term rate
averaging around 0.5% over a recent sixty-year period. 58
The second theoretical point involves the merits of the income tax's
theoretical burden on the risk-free return, assuming away the practical problems in accretion taxation. 59 While such analysis is beyond the scope of this
Article, notice should be taken of the long-running debate. In particular,
reasonable disagreement remains among serious scholars as to which base is
preferable, in theory. 60 The serious efforts of numerous scholars over many
54.
See Alvin C. Warren, Jr., How Much Capital Income Taxed Under an Income Tax is Exempt
Under a Cash Flow Tax?, 52 TAX L. REV. 1, 16 (1996) (summary and conclusions #3). This assumes
that the theoretic income tax appropriately adjusts for inflation. As shown in the textual example, this
also assumes that taxpayers make appropriate portfolio adjustments under the income tax. A further
assumption in certain circumstances is that taxpayers can borrow at the risk-free rate; i.e., where portfolio adjustments require individualized borrowing. See infra notes 165-71 and accompanying text (discussing the comparable issue under the hybrid approach). A theoretic income tax therefore could impose
an additional excess burden, relative to the cash flow consumption tax, on taxpayers with higher borrowing rates in certain circumstances. However, such potential excess tax burden has been criticized because
it varies based on taxpayers' individual borrowing rates. See Cunningham, supra note 38, at 35-39.
Furthermore, such burden can be maintained by forms of consumption taxation other than the cash flow
tax, such as the hybrid approach. See infra note 205 and accompanying text.
55.
$155,000 - ($155,000 X .5) = $77,500.
56.
$25,000 tax= 50% tax rate x ($100,000 stock value - $50,000 purchase price).
57.
$77,500 - $75,000 = $2,500. $2,500 = 50% tax rate x 10% risk-free rate x $50,000. See infra
notes 144-49 and accompanying text (offering a deeper explanation of this result).
58.
See Joseph Bankman & Thomas Griffith, Is the Debate Between an Income Tax and a Consumption Tax A Debate about Risk? Does it Matter?, 47 TAX L. REV. 377, 387-90 (1992) (for a detailed
analysis of the real risk-free rate).
59.
See supra note 25 and accompanying text regarding the practical reasons supporting realization
taxation.
60.
Compare Barbara H. Fried, Fairness and the Consumption Tax, 44 STAN. L. REV. 961, 1006-16
(1992) (rejecting attempts to justify a consumption tax on grounds that it preserves savers' relative
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years have failed to generate a decisive winner between the income and
consumption bases, even ignoring the income tax's serious practical problems. 61
C. Summary
The foregoing theoretical and practical points establish a strong threshold case for the consumption tax. The income tax imposes a relatively narrow excess burden on investment return, even in theory, and reasonable
doubts remain as to the desirability of such burden. Serious implementation
problems further allow select taxpayers to (i) avoid the relatively light excess burden on investment return62 and (ii) reduce their taxes on other income (e.g., wages). 63
In sum, those favoring the income tax in theory should consider instead
a consumption tax with progressive rates. Progressive rates satisfy the desire
to impose proportionately higher tax burdens on the wealthy. 64 The progressive consumption tax also must avoid problems comparable to those highlighted under the income tax. Depending on its structure, a consumption tax
therefore has the potential to satisfy, in practice, both theoretic consumption
tax and income tax advocates. 65 With these goals in mind, Part IV demonstrates the advantages of the hybrid approach relative to the cash flow tax.
IV. BENEFITS OF THE HYBRID APPROACH OVER THE CASH FLOW TAX
A clear consensus for the progressive consumption tax has failed to
emerge despite the strong threshold case delineated above. Prior commentators have raised serious concerns about the cash flow tax, which is the leading progressive consumption tax proposal.66 These problems have decreased
pretax positions), with Eric Rakowski, Can Wealth Taxes Be Justified, 53 TAX L. REV. 263, 356-57
n.158 (2000) (critiquing Professor Fried's analysis).
61.
See Bankrnan & Griffith, supra note 58, at 406 (noting that arguments by consumption tax
proponents that the income tax's burden on interest is unfair and inefficient "have been ably, but for the
most part, inconclusively, rebutted by defenders of the income tax").
62.
See, e.g., Example 2 under which T matched the consumption tax results, thereby avoiding the
tax burden on the risk-free return.
63.
See, e.g., Example 3.
64.
Income tax proponents often base their preference on the fact that (i) the income tax imposes an
additional burden on investment return, and (ii) the wealthy tend to receive higher percentages of investment income. The income tax's practical problems instruct, however, that distributional goals would
be better addressed through a progressive consumption tax. See Daniel N. Shaviro, Rethinking Anti-Tax
Shelter Rules: Protecting the Earned Income Tax Base, 71 TAXES 859 (1993). Many favoring a consumption tax in theory also prefer progressive rates. See, e.g., Rakowski, supra note 60, at 354 (discussing why "liberal egalitarians" might favor a progressive consumption tax); see also infra note 99. Not
everyone, of course, prefers progressive rates. See ROBERT HALL & ALVIN RABUSHKA, THE FLAT TAX
(1985). Nonetheless, a progressive consumption tax might be a more acceptable c9mpromise to flat tax
proponents than the current progressive income tax.
65.
As discussed in Subparts IV.A, D, and F.1, even those favoring a consumption tax in theory
might reject certain forms of consumption taxation.
66.
These concerns are discussed throughout this Part. Other proposals have linked a wage tax with
a business-level consumption tax. See infra note 99 and accompanying text. The hybrid approach has
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the attractiveness of a shift to the consumption tax. As shown herein, the
hybrid approach significantly addresses the problems in cash flow taxation.
Subpart N.A first discusses how an undesirable impact on risk-free savings
arises under the progressive cash flow tax. Subpart IV .B addresses tax
avoidance and evasion issues related to the lack of tax collections on saved
wages under the cash flow tax. Subpart N.C considers the linked transition
and revenue concerns that have hindered the cash flow tax. Subpart N.D
analyzes the treatment of risky returns under the different taxes. After Subart N .E addresses complexity issues, Subpart N .F summarizes the consensus potential of the hybrid approach.
A. Progressivity Impact on Risk-Free Savings

A consumption tax consensus likely requires progressive rates to satisfy
distributional concerns. Wealthy individuals would bear a greater percentage of the overall tax burden under a progressive consumption tax than a
flat consumption tax. 67 This progressivity desire, however, conflicts with the
most straightforward consumption tax model: a "sales" tax collected by
businesses on sales for consumption. 68 Administrative concerns preclude
tracking each individual's aggregate spending so that the tax could be collected at varying rates (based on each individual's overall spending). 69 In a
significant advancement, the cash flow tax demonstrated how each individual's consumption could be calculated without tracking expenditure.70 As
discussed above, this is accomplished through two major modifications to
the existing income tax base: (i) an unlimited deduction for savings (plus
debt repayments) and (ii) the inclusion of all savings withdrawals (plus borrowed funds). Progressive rates then could be applied to the individual's
resulting tax base.

several advantages over such linked wage and business tax approaches, including the ability to impose
progressivity on all receipts (not just wages) and avoidance of difficult classification issues regarding
which activities constitute businesses.
67.
A full discussion of the underlying merits of progressivity is beyond the scope of this Article. As
discussed supra in note 64 and the accompanying text, there is significant support for progressivity in
the tax system.
68.
For instance, a retail sales tax could be imposed only upon the ultimate sale for consumption.
Alternatively, a value-added tax could be imposed at every level of production (typically with offsetting
deductions or credits at the latter stages of production to minimize double taxation of the same value).
Thus, in theory, the two forms differ in the timing of the tax collection.
69.
KLEIN ET AL., supra note 2, at 383. Applying higher rates to luxury goods (and/or lower rates to
staples) might achieve some progressivity. This is unsatisfactory, however, for several reasons. First,
progressivity would turn on how money was spent rather than the amount of consumption. For example,
the consumption of large amounts of "non-luxury" goods would avoid the progressivity. Second, troubling classification issues arise in determining luxury items. Third, economic inefficiencies arise as some
consumers substitute "non-luxury" goods for "luxury" items. Id. Issues also arise regarding the treatment
of services.
70.
A 1974 article by Professor Andrews popularized the cash flow tax in the U.S. legal literature.
William D. Andrews, A Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1113
(1974); see NICHOLAS KALDOR, AN EXPENDITURE TAX (1955) (containing an earlier discussion of the
consumption or cash flow tax).
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The progressive cash flow tax is not without its own problems. Consider
first the treatment of savings under the progressive cash flow tax. As discussed more fully below in Subpart N.D, a flat-rate consumption tax generally can be viewed as implicitly exempting investment return from tax.71
The consumption tax receives substantial support from this perceived neutrality on savings.72 A progressive cash flow tax can deviate significantly
from this savings neutrality, thereby making the consumption tax less attractive.
First, saving wages could increase the tax burden even when invested at
only the risk-free interest rate. Consider the following example.
Example 6: T receives a $100,000 salary on each of 12/31/01 and
12/31/02. A fifty percent rate applies to amounts up to, and including, $100,000; additional amounts are taxed at a sixty percent rate.
T prefers to save all his year 0 1 wages for consumption in year 02,
investing at the ten percent risk-free rate. 73

Under the cash flow tax, T's tax base includes the $210,000 of pretax funds
available on 12/31/02: the $100,000 of year 02 salary, the $100,000 of
saved wages from year 01, and the $10,000 of interest income on the saved
wages. 74 T's tax bill in year 02 is $116,000, leaving $94,000 available for
consumption.75 Had T not saved, T could have consumed $50,000 each year
(after paying $50,000 tax each year on the $100,000 of wages). Therefore,
saving reduced T's overall consumption from $100,000 ($50,000 each year)
to $94,000. Under a neutral savings regime, however, T's overall consumption would have increased by $5000 because (i) T deferred $50,000 of consumption for one year and (ii) T invested at the ten percent interest rate.76
Savings neutrality was broken because the saved wages plus interest were

71.
For instance, Thad $55,000 of after-tax consumption in Example 1. The same result would
occur under a wage tax that explicitly exempted investment return. Under a fifty percent flat rate wage
tax, T would have paid $50,000 of tax on his $100,000 of wages in year 01. Investing $50,000 for one
year would have generated $55,000 investment proceeds one year later. No further tax would be imposed
on the investment return under the wage tax. For a more detailed analysis of risky investment returns,
see Subpart IV.D.
72.
See, e.g., BRADFORD, supra note 22; see also Rakowski, supra note 60.
73.
The assumption of no consumption in 01 was made for ease of exposition. Even where T consumes a portion of his salary, the more general conceptual point is that unequal spending from year to
year can lead to a progressivity impact (where the consumption-year tax rate differs from the wage-year
tax rate).
74.
As shown in Example 1, Tis not taxed in year 01 since the entire wages are saved.
75.
Tax liability= ($100,000 x 50%) + ($110,000 x 60%). $210,000-$116,000 = $94,000.
76.
The $50,000 deferred consumption multiplied by the ten percent investment rate. Under a savings-neutral wage tax with the same rates, T would pay $50,000 tax in year 01. In year 02, T again would
owe $50,000 tax on his wages but the investment proceeds (including the gain) would be exempt. This
would leave $105,000 available for consumption ($50,000 after-tax wages plus $55,000 ($50,000 x 1.1)
investment proceeds). The textual calculation assumes that interest rates did not rise in response to the
income tax.
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consumed in a heavy consumption year, thereby subjecting them to the
higher sixty percent progressive rate. 77
Next, favorably contrast the results under the hybrid approach. Even
though T saves all available after-tax wages, T pays $50,000 tax on the
$100,000 wages in 01 because savings deductions cannot offset wages. 78 T
invests the remaining $50,000, which grows to $55,000 as of 12/31/02.79
The year 02 hybrid base includes: (i) the $100,000 current-year salary (under the wage component) and (ii) the $55,000 savings withdrawal for consumption (under the adjusted cash flow component). 80 However, T can deduct his $55,000 basis offset account against the savings withdrawals. The
original basis offset account was $50,000 since T saved $50,000 in year
01. 81 The ten percent interest adjustment for one year increases the basis
offset account to $55,000.82 T's tax base is reduced to only the $100,000 of
wages, thereby generating another $50,000 tax liability.
T's after-tax consumption in year 02 under the hybrid approach therefore equals the savings neutral $105,000: $155,000 pre-tax proceeds less the
$50,000 tax liability on the current-year wages. 83 This resulted since the
hybrid approach avoided the progressivity impact on the saved wages and
the interest. Even though these amounts were used for consumption, the
basis offset account effectively excluded them from the adjusted cash flow
component of the hybrid approach for year 02. Savings neutrality was,
therefore, maintained on risk-free returns; the more complicated risky returns are discussed below in Subpart N.D.
Since T's unequal spending raised the progressivity concern under the
cash flow tax, the problem might appear negligible under the "life cycle"
hypothesis. Under this hypothesis, savings tend to smooth out annual consumption levels. 84 Significant concerns remain nonetheless. First, some
77.
T faced the higher sixty percent rate on $110,000 of his tax base, generating an $11,000 progressivity burden (i.e., the extra ten percent rate x $110,000). The $11,000 equals the sum of his actual
reduced consumption by virtue of saving ($6000) and the loss of the increased consumption that would
arise under a savings neutral system ($5000).
78.
50% x $100,000. As discussed supra at note 18 and accompanying text, other deductions allowed against wages under current law could offset the wages. For ease of exposition, such deductions
are assumed to be zero. This example also assumes that T paid the $50,000 wage tax in 0 I. See Subpart
IV.E for possible complications where the 01 tax liability is not paid until 02.
79.
$50,000 X (1.1).
80.
As discussed at Subpart II.C, consumption in excess of wages is included under this second
component. $155,000 cash flow consumption less $100,000 wages equals $55,000.
81.
The hybrid approach prevented T's $50,000 new savings deduction from offsetting his wages. If
Thad other savings withdrawals in the current year, the $50,000 alternatively could be used against such
dissaving.
82.
A one-year interest adjustment was correct since exactly one year elapsed between the 12/31/01
tax payment and the 12/31/02 savings withdrawal. See Subpart IV.E for more complicated scenarios
where some events occur on dates other than December 31.
83.
T's consumption should increase from $100,000 to $105,000 where T saves $50,000 for one
year at a ten percent interest rate. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
84.
See Alberto Ando & Franco Modigliani, The "Life Cycle" Hypothesis of Saving: Aggregate
Implications and Tests, 53 AM. ECON. REV. 55 (1963). Concerns might be further reduced if there were
relatively few rate brackets covering large amounts. See Lawrence Zelenak, The Selling of the Flat Tax:
the Dubious Link between Rate and Base, 2 CHAP. L. REV. 197, 222 (1999). Less broad-based brackets
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spending inequality from year to year is likely and occasionally more significant inequalities can arise where savings are used for cars, down payments on homes, and so forth. 85
In addition, wealth transfers could make the progressivity concern particularly acute since significant savings can be transferred at death (rather
than consumed at more regular levels). Some consumption tax proponents
couple their advocacy with a wealth transfer tax. 86 Such linkage strongly
appeals under a cash flow tax to preserve taxation of the transferor's earnings at the transferor's tax rate (since the transferor is not otherwise taxed
on saved wages). 87 A comparable argument arises under the hybrid approach despite its taxation of saved wages; if wealth transfers were exempt,
a significant tax incentive would arise to characterize wages as investment
return. 88 Treating wealth transfers as consumption by the transferor keeps
the cash flow and hybrid systems "closed."89 The view that wealth transfers
might be desired, however.
85.
The entire purchase price of a car or home would be taxed in the year of purchase notwithstanding the savings element on such consumer durables. See infra note 111 and accompanying text. The
special treatment of home acquisition indebtedness (and possibly other consumer debt) would respond to
additional "bunching" concerns on debt-financed acquisitions. See infra notes 112-13 and accompanying
text.
86.
See HENRY J. AARON & HARVEY GALPER, A Tax on Consumption, Gifts and Bequests, in
OPTIONS FORTAX REFORM (Joseph A. Pechman ed. 1984).
87.
If a tax were imposed only upon the transferee's consumption, wealthy taxpayers could lower
the tax burden on their heavy earnings by transferring assets to lower-bracket individuals (for example,
other family members). Insuring ultimate inclusion also preserves the notion that the consumption tax
burdens the taxpayer's endowments as reflected by receipts. See BLUEPRINTS, supra note 25, at 38-42
(offering a discussion of the endowment theory). As possible related support, the failure to tax wealth
transfers under the cash flow tax might raise concern as to potentially dynastic wealth growing from
generation to generation without any tax burden (under the cash flow tax). Compare James R. Repetti,
Democracy, Taxes, and Wealth, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 825 (2001) (concluding that current wealth transfer
taxes serve a useful role in curbing dynastic wealth). A cash flow tax without a wealth transfer tax would
exacerbate such concerns even relative to an income tax without a wealth transfer tax. See discussion
infra note 91.
88.
As discussed below, one attractive feature of the hybrid approach is that the cash flow component protects against taxpayer attempts to "convert" wages to investment income. The cash flow component provides such protection since paying tax on saved wages reduces future tax liabilities through the
basis offset account. If wealth transfers are not included in the transferor's tax base, the basis-offset
account might become irrelevant to the extent a taxpayer transfers wealth. In fact, a strategy of avoiding
wage characterization could backfire if lump-sum transfers were treated as consumption since they could
be taxed at a higher marginal rate; i.e., the hybrid approach results would then follow the cash flow tax
results.
89.
See David A. Weisbach, Ironing out the Flat Tax, 52 STAN. L. REV. 599 (2000) (discussing
virtue of closed system in analysis of proposed flat tax). The consumption tax could take the form of a
separate wealth transfer tax. As discussed above, however, seeing wealth transfers as a potential escape
hatch from the underlying consumption tax supports an integrated approach. An integrated approach is
especially compelling under the hybrid approach given the basis-offset account. See discussion infra
note 88 and accompanying text. Consideration could be given to some limited exclusionary amount for
wealth transfers. A limited exclusionary amount might be acceptable, especially given that tax avoidance
would require the taxpayer to transfer wealth (rather than consume himself).
Even if the wealth transfer tax were integrated into the consumption tax (by treating wealth transfers
as consumption), some gaps under the current wealth transfer system would remain. For instance, current techniques are used to reduce the reported value of transferred assets for transfer tax purposes. Such
techniques similarly might reduce the reported consumption value on asset transfers under an integrated
system. Similar issues would arise, however, even under a realization-income tax regime that treated
wealth transfers as a realization event (contrary to current law). An analysis of valuation concerns in the
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are a form of consumption provides additional support, although reasonable
arguments to the contrary have been made. 90 (As an aside, while this discussion appropriately focuses on the transferor's treatment, the transferee arguably should be taxed as well. 91 )
In sum, assuming wealth transfers are treated as consumption, the progressivity concern becomes more pronounced under the cash flow tax. The
cash flow tax could impose an undesirable higher burden on wealth transfers than the hybrid approach since it would include two additional amounts
in the wealth transfer year: (i) previously saved wages and (ii) the portion of
investment return equal to the risk-free rate. Thus, the cash flow tax could
impose a significant progressivity burden on the gradual buildup of even
modest amounts of wealth (and even in the absence of extraordinary investment returns).
Provisions averaging multiple years' tax base amounts might be considered under the cash flow tax as a response to such progressivity concems.92
wealth transfer context and potential responses is beyond the scope of this Article. See Laura Cunningham, Remember the AlamD: The IRS Needs Ammunition in Its Fight Against the FLP, 86 TAX NOTES
1461 (2000) (offering a discussion of some recent valuation techniques and potential responses).
90.
See Joseph M. Dodge, Taxing Gratuitous Transfers Under a Consumption Tax, 51 TAX L. REV.
529 (1996).
The equality of opportunity distributive justice theory provides related support; i.e., taxation should
reduce pretax unequal opportunities. Since progressivity is designed to smooth out unequal opportunities, the redistributive tax should apply even where the taxpayer decides to pass on excess resources
(likely attributable to excess opportunities) to others. In other words, others with less equal opportunities
do not even have such a choice.
Finally, even if one rejects the view that the transfers are a form of consumption, their treatment as
such might be a reasonable compromise. One critique of the cash flow approach has been that it fails to
take into account "availability of choice" by waiting to tax until consumption. See Fried, supra note 60,
at 963 n.7. Taxing transfers might, therefore, be viewed as a compromise (i.e., while the system declines
to tax control over assets while retained, tax would be imposed upon ultimate exercise of control through
direct consumption or transfer).
91.
For instance, under the equality of opportunity theory, a wealth transferee receives an unequal
excess opportunity. Similarly, under the view that a consumption tax burdens endowments, a recipient
arguably should be taxed on wealth transfers too. By generally avoiding the income tax's potential
"double" tax on saved wages (on wages and investment return), the consumption tax should weaken an
objection that taxing both transferor and transferee imposes too many levels of tax. Transferees could be
taxed only when the transferred funds were used for consumption. Multiple taxation of wealth transfers
implicates some of the current wealth transfer tax difficulties such as (i) distinguishing support payments
from wealth transfers and (ii) the appropriate treatment of generation-skipping transfers. See Charles 0.
Galvin, To Bury the Estate Tax, Not to Praise It, 52 TAX NOTES 1413 (1991). The merits of the hybrid
approach, however, can be considered independent of the issue of multiple wealth transfer taxation.
Assuming that the transferor reported the transferred property as consumption under the hybrid approach, double taxation could be avoided by, inter alia, increasing the transferee's basis offset account
by the transferred property's value. See also infra note 186 (offering an alternative treatment of wealth
transfers.) Thus, an analysis of the difficulties in subjecting wealth transfers to multiple taxation, and
potential responses, is beyond the scope of this Article. (Note that multiple taxation can be imposed on
wealth transfers under current law since, inter alia, the transferor might have paid income tax on the
original invested funds).
92.
As discussed infra notes 110-13 and accompanying text, some debt might be treated as "tax
prepaid." This, by itself, would allow some self-help averaging under the cash flow tax, since consumption funded by tax prepaid debt would be taxed upon debt repayment and not actual consumption. This is
an unsatisfactory response to the stated problem since tax prepaid debt treatment more generally allows
tax deferral, thereby exacerbating the tax collection concerns discussed in Subpart IV .B. As discussed
therein, the availability of tax prepaid debt treatment likely would be quite limited.
Another suggested approach would allow taxpayers to "prepay" the tax on investment returns when
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Full-scale averaging provisions, however, would likely be contentious,
complex, and imprecise. 93 Averaging provisions covering only several years
would provide only a partial response for long-term savings. 94 The hybrid
approach's built-in response compares favorably: all previously taxed
wages plus the risk-free return would be exempt from the tax base, even if
saved years ago. 95
Additional progressivity problems under the cash flow tax arise in the
other direction as well. Savings from high-wage years, which level consumption, would decrease the tax burden.96 While there might be some support for a savings incentive,97 the cash flow tax again compromises the savings neutrality argument in favor of a consumption tax. 98 Someone receiving high wages over a short time could minimize the progressivity impact
by significantly extending the consumption period. In particular, the imposithe investment is made by declining the usual investment deduction. In return, the investment proceeds
on such investments would be excluded. Thus taxpayers would have a choice to pay the tax at the investment year rate. BLUEPRINTS, supra note 25, at 119-27. This approach has been criticized for allowing tax avoidance possibilities. Michael J. Graetz, Implementing a Progressive Consumption Tax, 92
HARV. L. REV. 1575, 1598-1610 (1979). In addition, it is unlikely to generate a consensus since it fails
to collect tax in accordance with actual outcomes. Cf. infra note 157 and accompanying text (regarding
wage tax shortcomings).
93.
Cf. MARVIN CHIRELSTEIN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 261-62 (9th ed. 2002) (former income
averaging provisions "proved rather complex in operation" and "not clear that the eligibility requirements always succeeded in confining benefits [to the intended beneficiaries]"). Determining the period
of time over which the taxpayer could average highlights some of these issues. A shorter period denies a
full response to someone saving wages for an extended time period. A longer averaging period enhances
administrative concerns. In addition, a longer period increases the chances that benefits would extend
beyond the intended scope. Cf. id. ("[B]eneficiaries of income-averaging sometimes turned out to be
taxpayers who had enjoyed a sudden but sustained increase in earnings."). Compare also Richard
Schmalbeck, Income Averaging after Twenty Years: a Failed Experiment in Horizontal Equity, 1984
DUKE L.J 509 (arguing that equity arguments in favor of income averaging are insubstantial) with M.
Carr Ferguson & Edwin T. Hood, Income Averaging, 24 TAX L. REv. 53, 92 (1968) (construing income
averaging provisions to require balance equity appeal against administrative complexities).
94.
For a proposal suggesting averaging over several years for the more general concern of heavy
consumption within a year, see for example, Andrews, supra note 70, at 1157. See also Zelenak, supra
note 84, at 222 (discussing more general income averaging for "a period of a few years"). But see WHAT
SHOULD BETAXED: INCOME OR CONSUMPTION 318-19 (Pechman ed. 1980) ("[G]ifts and bequests could
be taxed under the [cash flow] tax itself only if some sort of averaging were provided."); Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Fairness and a Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax, 88 HARV. L. REV. 931,
945 (1975) (stating that savers could face a tax burden due to additional receipts equal to the investment
return, even assuming perfect lifetime averaging).
95.
Some progressivity concerns might remain where the taxpayer has significant risky returns. The
hybrid approach, however, significantly reduces such concerns relative to the cash flow tax. See discussion infra notes 160-63 and accompanying text.
96.
Saved wages could face lower rates if shifted to a low consumption year. See Warren, supra
note 94, at 945 n.53 for potential unfairness to someone preferring current consumption from high
wages. The extra taxable investment receipts might reduce the potential savings benefit. See discussion
supra note 94. Benefits would not accrue to the extent the shifting involved amounts in the middle of
rate brackets. See Zelenak, supra note 84, at 222.
97.
See Zelenak, supra note 84, at 222. There would be a tax incentive to save wages from high
earning years for consumption in lower wage years.
98.
See Warren, supra note 94, at 945 (offering that the strongest argument for consumption tax has
been compromised due to Joss of savings neutrality in both directions).
Imposing progressivity only on consumption also raises a related progressivity enforcement point.
By removing progressivity on wages, the cash flow system places greater reliance on successfully blocking attempts by high-bracket consumers (for example, parents) to shift consumption to lower-bracket
consumers (for example, children).
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tion of progressivity on high wages themselves, even if saved, generates a
fair degree of support. 99 Furthermore, this uncapped opportunity to avoid
progressivity on high wages might trouble even those favoring a more limited savings incentive. 100
The hybrid approach's current tax on saved wages responds to this progressivity impact as well. 101 Furthermore, in favorable contrast to the unlimited ability to minimize progressivity under the cash flow tax, the hybrid
approach could provide a more carefully circumscribed allowance. For instance, like current law, a limited amount of wages saved for retirement
could receive cash flow treatment (i.e., taxed only when withdrawn for consumption in retirement). 102 Finally, also in favorable contrast to the cash
flow tax, a legislative tax rate change generally would not impact saved
wages or the risk-free return thereon under the hybrid approach. 103
fu sum, the hybrid approach' s progressivity neutrality on saved wages
and the risk-free return is a positive tradeoff for a potential progressivity
problem of its own. Taxing wages upon receipt under a progressive rate
structure causes variance in tax burdens based on the timing of the wages.
This highlights the unavoidable tradeoff between savings shifts and wage
timing variance. 104 Unlike the cash flow tax, the hybrid approach favorably
follows the current resolution: rejecting savings shifts in favor of wagebased shifts. 105
99.
Progressivity on high wages might be justified under an equality of opportunity theory of distributive justice; i.e., taxation should reduce pretax unequal opportunities. As wages increase, especially
to really high levels, it arguably becomes increasingly more likely that unequal birth endowments and/or
sheer luck played a significant role (for example, an athlete or entertainer). See Rakowski, supra note 60.
Such high wages might, of course, be attributable to efforts devoted over a significant time frame (developing invention, medical school, athlete/entertainer spending years honing skills etc.). See Zelenak,
supra note 84, at 226-27 (noting possibility that persons with equal opportunities might have different
wage earning patterns). For prior proposals suggesting a progressive wage tax (coupled with a flat rate
business tax), see BRADFORD, supra note 22, at 329-34; David F. Bradford, What Are Consumption
Taxes and Who Pays Them, 39 TAX NOTES 383, 384-85 (1988); and CHARLES MCLURE & GEORGE
ZODROW, A HYBRID APPROACH TO THE DIRECT TAXATION OF CONSUMPTION, 1N FRONTIERS OF TAX
REFORM 70, 72 (Boskin ed., 1996). Additional supporters of progressivity on wages include those favoring a progressive income tax in theory. See Martin J. McMahon, Jr. and Alice G. Abreu, Winner-TakeAll Markets: Easing the Case for Progressive Taxation, 4 FLA. TAX REV. 1 (1998).
100.
Under current law, taxpayers who save in qualified retirement plans can avoid progressivity on
wages in high wage years. This ability to avoid the current progressivity burden is limited. First, there
are caps on the amount of wages qualifying for such tax deferral treatment. See infra note 102. In addition, there are limits on the use of the saved amounts (e.g., for retirement). A pure cash flow tax would
remove such amount and uses limitations.
101.
As discussed at Subpart II.C, the wages themselves would be taxed. Compare the wage tax's
neutrality on savings decisions at Subpart IV.D.1.
102.
Such limits could be based on the current law limits. See, e.g.,§ I.R.C. 219 (2003) (dollar limitations on deductible contributions to individual retirement accounts); id. § 415 (dollar limitations on
contributions to qualified retirement plans).
103.
Under the cash flow tax, rate increases could harm savers while tax rate decreases could benefit
savers. For an attempt to justify such impact under the cash flow tax, see Andrews, supra note 70.
104.
See supra note 99 and accompanying text (arguing that the case for progressivity on all wages is
mixed).
105.
See Engler & Knoll, supra note 50 (As a threshold matter this is a transitional advantage of the
hybrid approach over the cash flow tax, since it avoids opening up the contentious progressivity tradeoff
issue.). At the substantive level, someone favoring a consumption tax for its implicit savings exemption
should be more accepting of the potential wage tax shortcomings. See Warren, supra note 94, at 945
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B. Collection and Tax Avoidance Issues
The cash flow tax's failure to tax saved wages raises tax avoidance and
evasion issues. Currently, an employer must report wages to the IRS and
withhold taxes from an employee's paycheck. This provides tax evasion
protection. 106 Wage withholding and information reporting would be inapplicable, or ineffective, under the cash flow tax to the extent of an employee's saved wages. 107 Shifting to the cash flow tax, therefore, would increase the pressure on tax collections from savings/investment withdrawals. 108 Even assuming the system could adapt to such increased pressure,
(noting that the progressivity impact under a progressive cash flow tax undercuts the strongest argument
in favor of consumption taxation; in contrast, a graduated wage tax avoids this objection). In theory,
similar issues arise under both the income tax and the wage tax. One might also favor high progressivity
based on wages despite potential inequities in certain circumstances. See discussion supra note 99.
Furthermore, the removal of progressivity on wages under the cash flow tax exacerbates concerns that
taxpayers might minimize the progressivity impact by transferring assets. to lower-bracket family members. Due to under valuation reporting issues, this could result even if wealth transfers were treated as
consumption to the transferor. See discussion supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text. Finally, the
hybrid approach has flexibility to resolve the tradeoff differently if a consensus ultimately forms in favor
of accepting the savings shifts over the wage shifts. See discussion irifra note 197.
Depending on one's view as to when wage variance raises fairness issues, tax avoidance concerns
can arise regarding taxpayer attempts to defer wage receipts from the year of performance to lower rate
years. As the same issue arises under current law, current doctrines like constructive receipt, economic
benefit, and cash equivalence provide some protection. See CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 93, at § 11.01. In
addition, there might be practical impediments to the wage deferral strategy. See discussion infra note
135. Taxing wages on the accrual method also could be considered.
106.
Information reporting highlights the presence of taxable receipts. Wage withholding supplements the information reporting; thus, the system no longer relies solely on the payment of the correct
tax by the employees themselves. See David Cay Johnston, U.S. Warns to Businesses on Tax Protest,
N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 2001, at Cl (noting that no taxes collected when businesses stop withholding).
While wage withholding is not foolproof; for instance, employees can overstate exemptions; it nonetheless provides another layer of protection.
107.
While withholding technically could be required, such withholdings would be refundable given
the lack of underlying tax liability. Similarly, the information reporting would no longer highlight for the
IRS the correct tax inclusion time on saved wages. A slight tiering problem would arise in fully negating
the withholding tax where the tax rate is expressed on a tax-inclusive basis. Assume Tis paid $1000
wages on 12/31/01 and a tax-inclusive rate of forty percent. The employer withholds $400. T invests the
remaining $600 in 01, leaving a final 01 tax base of $400. T receives back only $240 of the $400 withheld. ($400 less $160 tax liability on final 01 tax base.) Investing the $240 refund generates a $96 refund
(.4 x $240) in 02, and so on. Although T ultimately receives back the full $400 withheld, there is a timing detriment (as $160 is received in later years). T receives back the $400 in 01 under an equivalent 66
2/3% tax exclusive rate (since taxes are deductible when withheld in 01). See Graetz, supra note 92, at
1582-84 (illustrating the converse point on under withholding).
108.
See, e.g., WHAT SHOULD BE TAXED: INCOME OR EXPENDITURE, supra note 94, at 316-17 (problems on monitoring, especially since withdrawn sales proceeds fully taxable. under cash flow tax); Michael J. McIntyre, Commentary: The Design of Tax Rules for the North American Free Trade Alliance,
49 TAX L. REV. 769, n.14 (1994) (stating that "a good percentage of saved income would escape taxation entirely" partly due to tax evasion); Richard Musgrave, Clarifying Tax Reform, 70 TAX NOTES 731,
734 (1996) (the necessary monitoring of financial transactions "will not be easy"). Withholding on
savings withdrawals is unlikely to provide equivalent withholding protection due to, inter alia, the difficulty in determining the taxpayer's overall tax bracket on each savings withdrawal. See Graetz, supra
note 92, at 1596 ("[W]ithholding on expenditure tax receipts other than wages does not seem practical."). In particular, a taxpayer might have low withdrawals from different accounts with different withholding agents. In contrast, wages tend to be received from a limited number of sources, typically providing sufficient progressivity information to the withholding agent. Withholding at a low rate would
provide only partial protection. In addition, over withholding still could result where the taxpayer has
transition basis deductions. Furthermore, full protection would require withholding on a broad range of
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expatriation concerns would remain. In particular, U.S. taxpayers emigrating with savings might avoid all U.S. tax on saved wages. 109
Additional concerns might arise due to the likely special treatment of
home acquisition indebtedness. Contrary to the cash flow rules for regular
debt, (i) the proceeds from such "exempt" debt likely would be excluded
from the tax base, while (ii) repayments of such exempt debt would be nondeductible. 110 Such exempt treatment responds to the extreme progressivity
"bunching" concerns on home purchases.
The bunching concern follows from the special issues presented by consumer durables. Under the cash flow tax, investments, but not currentconsumption assets, should be deductible. Consumer durables, like a home
or car, are purchased partly for both purposes. The theoretic ideal-current
deduction for the asset's purchase price and annual inclusion of each year's
consumption element-raises administrative difficulties. Therefore, for
practical reasons, commentary on the cash flow tax typically suggests
eliminating both the deduction and the annual inclusions. On a present value
basis, the tax cost of the denied current deduction approximates the elimination of the subsequent inclusions. 111
transactions, such as real estate sales, and leasing arrangements. Similarly, effective information reporting would require reporting of all such financial transactions.
109.
Concern arises since savings withdrawals would occur when the taxpayer was outside the
United States taxing regime. The seriousness of this problem has been debated. See WHAT SHOULD BE
TAXED: INCOME OR EXPENDITURE, supra note 94, at 323 (emigration "acknowledged to be extremely
troublesome"); Reuven Avi-Yonah, Comments on Grubert & Newlon, 49 NAT'L TAX J. 259,261 (1996)
(downplaying significance); Harry Grubert & T. Scott Newlon, The International Implications of Consumption Tax Proposals, 48 NAT'L TAX J. 619, 640 (1995) (noting emigration and vacationing abroad
problems); Harry Grubert & T. Scott Newlon, Reply to Avi-Yonah, 49 NAT'L TAX JOURNAL 267, 267
(1996) (noting the foreign consumption problem); McIntyre, supra note 108, at 769 n.14 (stating that "a
good percentage of saved income would escape taxation entirely" partly due to expatriation). An expatriation tax would not be as effective as an initial wage tax. A comparable problem exists under current
law when taxpayers expatriate holding appreciated assets. The cash flow tax exacerbates the problem
since the entire value, not just gain, should be taxed. The current expatriation tax reportedly is virtually
unenforceable. See, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, From Income to Consumption Tax: Some International
Implications, 33 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1329, 1338 (1996); Graetz, supra note 92, at 1648 (noting lack of
easy response to expatriation issue).
110.
For administrative reasons, relatively low levels of consumer indebtedness also might receive
this special treatment. See Graetz, supra note 92, at 1618-20.
Treating consumer debt under the exempt debt regime also protects the government against a tax
avoidance possibility where consumer goods are purchased on credit. Where consumer debt is treated
under the normal cash flow rules, the purchaser's tax liability would be decreased where the interest
component of the deferred payment was overstated (with a corresponding understatement of the purchase price of the good). A comparable problem arises under the current income tax, as well, since the
seller of a capital asset has an incentive to understate the interest component of a deferred payment (so
that some of the interest would qualify for capital gains rates and possibly deferral). See I.RC. § 1274
(2003) (providing a partial response for covered transactions).
111.
See, e.g., BLUEPRINTS, supra note 25, at 121-22; Graetz, supra note 92, at 1614-15. In addition,
some prior commentary has also suggested including in the tax base the receipt of sales proceeds/rent in
excess of the original purchase price. Losses, however, would not be allowed. See, e.g., Graetz, supra
note 92, at 1616-18; Zodrow & McLure, supra note 44, at 468-69.
Nondeductible purchase price plus gain inclusion might raise concerns that such "double tax" restores the income tax's incentive to consume rather than save (i.e., current consumption avoids the
double tax). In response, however, the nondeductible/gain inclusion rule would apply to a much more
narrow universe of assets under the hybrid approach. Furthermore, taxpayers are compensated for the
nondeductible purchase price by the exclusion of the actual consumption element each year. The present
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While this approach addresses the administrative concerns, the entire
purchase price of a home would be taxed in the acquisition year if the mortgage amount were treated under the normal cash flow rules. 112 The exempt
debt treatment responds to this concern by limiting the current year's inclusion to the down payment. 113 Exempt debt, however, would allow current
tax avoidance where the debt proceeds finance, in substance, the acquisition
11
of deductible savings assets.
Such concerns should be less threatening than the income tax shortcomings discussed in Subpart 11.B for two reasons. First, a future tax liability
with an equivalent present value generally would arise. 115 Second, the narrow circumstances in which the consumption tax concerns arise favorably
contrast with the more general avoidance possibilities under the income
tax. 116 Special tax avoidance rules (for example, loss of exempt debt treatment in abusive situations) would further reduce concerns. 117 Nonetheless,
the ability to defer ~aying taxes, until after consumption, exacerbates the
1 8
collection concerns.
value equivalency of the purchase price and subsequent consumption use generally eliminates the time
value of money concerns that exist under the current structure. In addition, the income tax has its own
imprecision on consumer durables. See Engler & Knoll, supra note 50, at 74-76 for a more detailed
discussion of consumer durables, including why the imperfections under the consumption tax do not
favor retention of the income tax.
112.
Assume T purchases a $500,000 home in 01 using (i) $100,000 savings for the down payment
and (ii) a $400,000 loan. Treating the loan under the normal cash flow rules would increase T's 2001 tax
base by $500,000 ($100,000 dissaving plus $400,000 loan proceeds included under cash flow approach).
"Bunching" the home's lifetime of deferred consumption into a single year unjustly subjects T to greater
progressivity (liquidity concerns also might arise as a portion of the borrowing would be needed to pay
taxes). This rule would not eliminate bunching concerns attributable to the down payment.
113.
On the above example, the $400,000 loan proceeds would not be added to the 01 tax base.
Instead, T would have additional inclusions as the mortgage (principal and interest) was repaid. See infra
note 115 and accompanying text.
114.
Assume Towns an appreciated house free and clear of debt. T sells the house, purchasing another house of equal value (for example, $1,000,000). T borrows eighty percent of the purchase price of
the new house (for example, $800,000), thereby freeing up $800,000 of sales proceeds from the first
house. T invests the $800,000; the resulting $800,000 savings deduction allows tax-free.consumption for
the foreseeable future. For a comparable avoidance attempt under the USA tax, see Martin D. Ginsburg,
Life Under a Personal Consumption Tax: Some Thoughts on Working, Saving, and Consuming In NunnDomenici' s Tax World, 48 NAT'L TAXJ. 585,597 (1995) (containing "Sell Your Fine Home" example).
Forcing T to recognize gain on the sale of the home would block this scheme. It is likely, however, that
some, or all, of the gain would be excluded from the tax base. As discussed supra at note 111, consumer
durable gain generally would be included. Nonetheless, consistent with current law some gain on the
sale of a home might be excluded regardless of whether a new home is purchased. See I.R.C. § 121
(2003). Alternatively, such gain might be excluded under a rollover rule to the extent T purchases a new
home of equal or greater value. See the rollover rule in the proposed USA tax, discussed in Ginsburg,
supra, at 597.
115.
While the principal would be excluded on receipt, taxpayers would lose later deductions on the
payment of both principal and interest for exempt debt. The taxpayer would have a net inclusion at such
time since the funds used to repay such debt would be included in the base.
116.
Also note that the current income tax's special tax treatment of home indebtedness raises tax
avoidance possibilities as well. Current deductibility of home interest (subject to limits) allows tax
avoidance possibilities when such debt funds the acquisition of capital assets. See Engler, supra note 42,
at 93-94.
117.
See discussion supra note 114. Separately, anti-avoidance rules would be needed to block attempts to report consumer durables as investment assets (to obtain a current deduction).
118.
Additional concern might arise that T could "default" on the tax liability. Even if T repays the
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The hybrid approach responds to these collection concerns. First, the
hybrid approach responds to the general tax avoidance and evasion concerns
by maintaining tax collections on saved wages at the wage date. Second, the
prohibition against offsetting wages with new savings deductions also protects against the specific concern on exempt debt. 119 Thus, residual tax collection concerns under the hybrid approach's adjusted cash flow component
would be reduced relative to the cash flow tax. The hybrid approach would
tax savings withdrawals for consumption only to the extent such amounts
exceeded saved wages plus the risk-free rate of return. 120 In addition, the
concerns under the hybrid approach would be more comparable to current
law; i.e., investment gains generate tax liabilities under an income tax
base. 121
C. Transition/Revenue Concerns
The primary transition issue under the cash flow tax involves post-shift
consumption funded from receipts saved and taxed under the prior income
tax (wages, for example). 122 Including withdrawals of such savings in the
tax base, as under the normal cash flow rules, would result in an unfair double tax. 123 This potential double tax should be corrected. 124 Specifically exthird-party lender, T would need additional resources to pay tax on the funds used to repay the debt.
Limiting the amount of exempt debt provides a significant response. (Treating debt under the regular
cash flow rules eliminates this concern since no tax liability arises on receipts used to repay such deductible debt.) Also, a broader default concern exists under the realization income tax. As discussed in
Subpart II.B, a taxpayer holding offsetting gain and loss investments could selectively sell only the
losing investment, with such loss offsetting otherwise taxable consumption. While the sale of the gain
investment would trigger a later tax liability, a third party lender could have a prior claim to the sales
proceeds. See Knoll, supra note 46. Thus, the default possibility exists under the income tax whenever
sales proceeds are needed to repay third party debt. In contrast, the potential arises only on exempt debt
under the cash flow tax. Also recall how T benefited under the income tax even absent the extreme
insolvency scenario contemplated here with the interest-free deferral benefit. Separately, T might default
on the underlying third party debt. While taxing debt forgiveness would preserve the government's tax
claim, T might lack the resources to pay such tax. See Graetz, supra note 92, at 1609. This is also present
under the income tax, however, and limiting exempt debt should lessen the issue relative to the income
tax.
119.
An alternative understanding of the additional protection recognizes that the concern regards tax
collections on savings withdrawals. The hybrid approach relies relatively less on collections from savings withdrawals due to its strengthened wage tax (and corresponding basis offset account).
120.
Cf WHAT SHOULD BE TAXED, INCOME OR EXPENDITURE, supra note 94, at 316 (discussing the
concern that cash flow tax raises greater collection concerns than the income tax since the entire proceeds would be taxable under the cash flow tax). Note that the full proceeds would not be taxable under
the cash flow tax to the extent the taxpayer had usable transition deductions.
121.
Additional concern might arise under the hybrid approach that taxpayers could avoid the wage
tax protection by "converting" wages to investment income (and then offsetting the converted investment income through the phantom savings deductions). This does not favor the income tax over the
hybrid approach, however, since a conversion transaction under current law similarly removes the wage
tax protection. See discussion supra note 42. Thus, the wage tax protection under the hybrid approach is
comparable to the current law protection; i.e., both have an extra level of protection vis-a-vis the cash
flow tax. Similarly, under the hybrid approach, the incentive to shift wages from a high salary to a low
salary year is present under current law. See discussion supra note 105.
122.
See Engler & Knoll, supra note 50, for a more in-depth analysis of how the hybrid approach
greatly simplifies the transition to a consumption tax.
123.
Assume the cash flow tax replaces the income tax in year 02 and a flat forty percent rate. T pays
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empting consumption funded from already-taxed savings raises tracing difficulties.125 To avoid such administrative problems, taxpayers could be allowed "transition" deductions, usable against all consumption, equal to the
aggregate tax basis of savings assets held at transition. 126 This approach
raises revenue concerns, however, since a taxpayer would pay no tax until
the exhaustion of all transition and new savings deductions. 127 The possible
solution of issuing explicit government debt in the intervening years 128
raises political concerns. 129

$400 income tax on $1,000 wages received on 12/31/01. T saves the remaining $600, withdrawing it for
consumption on 1/01/02. Since savings withdrawals increase the new base, T pays additional tax of $240
($600 x 40%) in year 02, for total taxes of $640 on $1000 wages.
124.
There is a general consensus for transition relief from this problem, which is attributable to the
government's shift in the timing for inclusion of saved wages. See DANIEL SHAVIRO, WHEN RULES
CHANGE, 183-87 (2000); Avishai Shachar, The Importance of Considering Liabilities in Tax Transitions,
98 HARV. L. REV. 1842 (1985). For a thoughtful analysis providing the alternate view, see Joseph
Bankman, The Engler-Knoll Consumption Tax Proposal: What Transition Rule Does Fairness (or Politics) Require, 56 SMU L. REV. 83 (2003). Other transition issues include the continuation of preferences
like the current exclusion of state and local bond interest (since the preference might have reduced the
pretax interest rate). The merits of transition relief for such preferences, however, are far less certain than
the textual double tax issue. See Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions 99 HARV. L.
REV. 509,607 (1986); Shachar, supra; Shaviro, supra at 181-82. But see Graetz, supra note 92, at 164953; see also Engler & Knoll, supra note 50, at 69-70 n.85 (noting how the hybrid approach has flexibility to provide special relief on these issues as well, if needed for a political consensus).
125.
Specific tracking rules also might encourage taxpayers to fund consumption from assets in
which they have a relatively high purchase price.
126.
Tax basis on purchased assets equals the purchase price less the tax depreciation, if any. Unusable deductions could be carried forward to subsequent years, possibly with an interest increase. See
infra note 131 for the appropriateness of an interest adjustment in a comparable context. Allowing transition deductions for all basis arguably is overbroad. For instance, under I.RC. § 1014 (2003), recipients
receive a basis equal to an asset's value at the time of a bequest even though no income taxes have been
paid on any appreciation (although some estate tax may have been paid). Distinguishing "taxed" basis
from "tax-free" basis raises complexity concerns.
127.
See Alliance USA, Unlimited Savings Allowance (USA) Tax System, 66 TAX NOTES 1482
(1995) (noting "substantial revenue shortfall during the early years"); see also Graetz, supra note 92, at
1654 (wealthy could pay no tax indefinitely); George Mundstock, Comment: What's on Second, 51 U.
MIAMI L. REV., 1079, 1081 (1997) (noting revenue loss if investments currently deductible); accord
DAVID BRADFORD, CONSUMPI'ION TAX: SOME FuNDAMENTAL 'TRANSITION ISSUES, IN FRONTIERS OF
TAX REFORM at 142 (Hoskin ed. 1996). Additional concern might arise that taxpayers would resolve
ambiguities about actual tax basis at the time of transition in their favor (e.g., stock purchased years
earlier). See Alliance USA, supra. While basis uncertainty is a problem under current law, the suggested
cash flow transition approach would allow such overstated basis to offset all income. Compare favorably
the hybrid approach.
128.
If interest were provided on deferred transition deductions, see discussion supra note 131, the
government's cost is comparable. E.g., WHAT SHOULD BE TAXED: INCOME OR CONSUMPTION, supra
note 94, at 310 (noting that government could alter its explicit borrowing).
129.
See Louis Kaplow, Recovery of Pre-Enactment Basis under a Consumption Tax: The USA Tax
System, 95 TAX NOTES 171-47 (Aug. 31, 1995) (increasing conventional government debt would not be
politically feasible). Compare Daniel Altman, Accounts Chock-Full or a Plan Half-Empty?, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 1, 2003, at Cl (stating that the Bush proposal allows conversions of traditional IRAs to tax-exempt
accounts in order to "shift revenue from the future to now"). The wealthy also could avoid all tax for an
extended time. See Shounak Sarkar & George R. Zodrow, Transitional Issues in Moving to a Direct
Consumption Tax, 46 NAT'L TAX J. 359, 363 (1993) (in context of a business consumption tax, noting
the problem of certain businesses paying no tax in the early years). A significant increase in explicit
government debt also might raise non-tax concerns. Separately, allowing certain taxpayers to avoid all
tax payments on all their consumption for an extended period raises the tax collection concerns discussed above.
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A prior legislative proposal therefore allowed transition deductions to
offset only consumption funded from savings assets. 130 This approach is
theoretically sound since the transition deductions correspond to savings
assets. 131 Prior commentary showed, however, that sophisticated taxpayers
could avoid such limit merely by deferring the receipt of wages by one
year. 132 In addition, overall revenue concerns might remain given the lack of
tax collections on (i) post-transition saved wages (due to new savings deductions) and (ii) much post-transition consumption (due to transition deductions).133
The wage component of the hybrid approach once again responds to
these concerns. The hybrid approach more naturally would restrict the use
of transition deductions to savings-funded consumption. For instance, transition deductions could be added to the regular basis offset account. 134 Furthermore, deferring the receipt of salary until the next year would not meaningfully circumvent this desired restriction. Such one-year deferral would
130.
USA Tax Act of 1995, S. 722, 104th Cong. (1995) (sponsored by Sens. Nunn, Kerrey, and
Domenici). The USA approach had an additional limitation in that transition assets needed to be sold to
free up the transition basis. This limitation would not be meaningful in practice. See Ginsburg, supra
note 114, at 596.
131.
Thus, an alternative suggestion raises other concerns. Each year's usable transition deductions
could be limited to a fixed percentage of the overall amount; unused amounts could be carried forward
with interest. Kaplow, supra note 129. The interest addresses concerns that accelerating taxes (by deferring deductions) increases the taxpayer's cost under time value of money principles. Transition basis
should be reduced by the taxpayer's liabilities (other than debt exempt from cash flow treatment. For
possible exempt debt, see notes 110-13 and accompanying text). Tax still would not be paid, however,
on either (i) saved wages, due to unlimited new savings deductions or (ii) significant consumption (due
to the partial allowance of the transition deductions). While a low percentage allowance would minimize
revenue losses, the likelihood of double taxation increases where significant transition savings are spent
in early post-shift years. Taxpayers would benefit from the carry forward of unused transition deductions
only if they generated enough subsequent consumption through new wages or extraordinary investment
returns on their remaining savings. Compare a similar, but more limited possibility of unusable basis
under the hybrid approach at supra notes 175-78 and accompanying text. The hybrid approach has
several advantages over the other alternative including: (i) full allowance of transition basis against
consumption funded from savings, (ii) tax collections on saved wages, and (iii) responsiveness to the
other concerns raised under the cash flow tax.
132.
Ginsburg, supra note 114, at 596. The strategy involves the following: taxpayers arrange to have
their salary paid only in alternate odd-numbered years (deferring receipt of the even-year salary until the
following odd year); savings assets are used to purchase consumption goods only in even years (but
goods are consumed in even and odd years); transition deductions offset the consumption purchased
from savings assets in the even years; salary paid in odd years replenishes the withdrawn savings assets;
whereby the resulting new savings deductions avoid all tax on the salary. Additional tax-free consumption in the odd years could be achieved by (i) purchasing a consumer durable asset in an even year and
(ii) selling it in the odd year, using the proceeds to fund consumption. For the exclusion of consumer
durable proceeds when sold for the original purchase price, see supra note 111. In sum, taxpayers would
avoid tax on (i) the salary (since it was "saved") and (ii) all consumption (since it was funded from
"savings").
133.
Revenue would not be collected from (i) saved wages or (ii) significant consumption funded
from savings (due to transition deductions). The problem is that taxes generally are collected on the
"front-end" as wages are paid under current law (even if they are saved). Under the cash flow tax, taxing
savings withdrawals on the "back-end" compensates for the revenue loss from savers on the front-end.
Revenue is not collected from either group, however, if the shift to the back-end cash flow tax contains
appropriate transition relief for asset holders, the future dissaving population. This revenue loss is most
pronounced in the early years of the interim transition period since tax collections from dissavers (once
transition deductions are used up) eventually will offset the revenue loss from savers.
134.
Recall that the basis offset account is usable only against non-wage consumption.
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merely defer the tax payment until the following year, in favorable contrast
to the long-term deferral concern expressed under the cash flow tax. 135 The
hybrid approach also generates revenue on saved wages. 136 The stronger
wage tax base facilitates appropriate transition relief (i.e., free deductibility
of all transition basis against consumption funded from savings). 137

135.
A comparable strategy under the hybrid approach would require a more difficult, prolonged
deferral of salary. Under such prolonged deferral strategy, the taxpayer would fund consumption from
savings withdrawals, using transition deductions to avoid tax. Interest on the deferred salary would
provide an investment return. This indefinite salary deferral, however, is less likely to be acceptable to
taxpayers from a non-tax perspective than the one-year deferral strategy under the cash flow tax. First,
taxpayers would have to bear their employer's credit risk for an extended period of time. (Under current
law, taxpayers generally can avoid current tax on deferred salary only if the employer's promise to pay is
unfunded and unsecured.) Second, converting their assets to deferred rights against their employer might
limit their investment opportunities on such long-term "savings assets." In contrast, the one-year deferral
strategy under the cash flow tax requires a deferral of one year or less (until January I of the next year).
In any event, if thought problematic, a rule could limit the deferral of "earned but unpaid" wages (even if
an unfunded, unsecured promise to pay). See discussion supra note 105 (regarding potential accrual
system on wages). A similar rule for the one-year deferral year problem under the cash flow tax would
need a precise allocation of salary to the correct year in order to be effective. In contrast, such precision
is not necessary under the hybrid approach (where the concern is to prevent unlimited deferral). (Precise
income allocation, however, might be desirable for reasons of rate progressivity. See discussion supra
note 105.)
136.
This responds to the overall revenue loss concern under the cash flow tax during transition (due
to the lack of collections from savers and some consumers). See discussion supra note 133 and accompanying text.
A separate revenue point concerns the corporate tax. The corporate-level tax arguably lacks theoretic justification once shareholders are taxed on consumption under the cash flow tax or the hybrid
approach. See Graetz, supra note 92, at 1634-42 (raising this point in the context of the cash flow tax).
Shifting to a consumption tax at the individual level therefore might raise revenue concerns if such move
required the elimination of the corporate tax. In response, however, similar theoretic objections have
been raised regarding the corporate tax under the current "income" tax structure. See, e.g., Colloquium
on Corporate Integration, 47 TAX L. REv. 427 (1992). A possible argument that the corporate tax substitutes for the failure to tax shareholders currently on their share of corporate income fails to withstand
close scrutiny. The current corporate and income tax regime has a weak correlation to a current tax on
each shareholder (on their share of corporate income). In addition to the different rates faced by different
shareholders, consider, for instance, a corporation that pays out most of its earnings as dividends. This
presents the classic double taxation scenario as the corporate-level tax is imposed on top of a current
shareholder tax on the dividends.) Thus, corporate tax revenues do not favor the retention of the income
tax over a consumption tax. That is, a theoretically questionable corporate tax could be maintained in
conjunction with either an individual-level income or consumption tax.
137.
Compare the criticism of the USA bill's compromise due to revenue concerns. See Kaplow,
supra note 129; Alvin C. Warren, Jr., The Proposal for an "Unlimited Savings Allowance," 68 TAX
NOTES 1103 (1995). Recall also the concern that taxpayers might overstate allowable deductions. Concern is reduced when the deductions cannot shelter new wages.
Denying transition relief might impose an efficient one-time tax on existing savings. The transition
double tax arguably is efficient since taxpayers holding previously taxed savings at transition generally
cannot change their behavior to avoid such excess tax (taxpayers with knowledge of an impending
consumption tax could avoid the tax, but only by using their savings to consume before the effective
date). In fact, it has been argued that this potential double tax provides most of the efficiency gains from
a shift to a consumption tax. See ALAN AUERBACH, Tax Reform, Capital Allocation, Efficiency, and
Growth, in ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF FuNDAMENTALTAX REFORM 31 (Henry J. Aaron & William G. Gale
eds., 1996).
Notwithstanding the loss of an efficient one-time wealth tax, many proponents of a consumption tax
favor transition relief for existing basis. E.g., FuNDAMENTAL TRANSITION ISSUES, supra note 127, at
144-47; see also Sarkar & Zodrow, supra note 129, at 363 (while efficiency suggests revenue benefits to
denying transition relief, lack of transition relief has cost of offsetting expectations regarding future tax
policy); see supra note 124.
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D. Risky Returns

This Subpart contrasts the treatment of risky returns under the hybrid
approach and the cash flow tax. As discussed above, the consumption tax
receives significant support from its implicit exemption of investment return. Therefore, this risky return analysis also compares the hybrid approach
to a stand-alone wage tax, under which earned wages face current tax with
an explicit exemption for all investment return. Subpart IV.D.1 analyzes the
progressivity impact on risky returns. As shown therein, the hybrid approach imposes a desirable moderate progressivity burden on risky returns,
whereas the cash flow and wage taxes take polar positions. Subpart IV.D.2
then considers several other potential risky return burdens that are independent of progressive rates.

1. Progressive Rate Issues
Subpart IV.A analyzed the cash flow tax's progressivity burden on
saved wages and the risk-free return. 138 A progressive cash flow tax similarly could burden risky returns. This is especially possible since the cash
flow base includes the original investment amount, the risk-free return, and
the risky premium when savings are withdrawn for consumption. 139 At the
other end of the spectrum, the wage tax's direct exemption of all investment
return fails to impose any progressivity burden on risky returns, even where
the risky returns materially enhance a taxpayer's lifestyle. The hybrid approach moderates by imposing a progressivity burden on risky premiums,
but not on the other components. The following examples illustrate these
principles.
Example 7 assumes a flat tax rate to focus on the underlying structures
of the three different taxes regarding risky returns. Example 8 then applies
progressive rates to a risky return scenario.
Example 7: Treceives a $100,000 cash salary on 12/31/01. T invests
all (after-tax) wages in a risky stock that doubles in value as of
12/31/02. T consumes all (after-tax) proceeds on 12/31/02. The tax
rate is a flat fifty percent.

Consider first the wage tax. T owes $50,000 tax in year 01 on the
wages. 140 T invests the remaining $50,000 of (after-tax) wages in the stock.
138.
This might arise because (i) the cash flow tax has extra tax base inclusions equal to the risk-free
return on saved wages or (ii) saved wages can be consumed (including through wealth transfers) in
relatively heavier consumption years. The saved wage amount is included earlier under the hybrid approach than the cash flow approach. This potential also could work in the other direction if wages are
earned in a high wage-earning year and are consumed in a lower year. See discussion supra notes 96-101
and accompanying text.
139.
Risky returns generally should increase the likelihood of the progressivity burden given the
inclusion of extra amounts in the tax base. See Warren, supra note 94, at 945 n.53.
140.
0.5 X $100,000.
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The stock is sold one year later for $100,000. No further tax is owed given
the direct exemption of all investment return. T's after-tax consumption is
$100,000.
Consider, next, the results under the cash flow tax. T owes no tax in
year 01 since T saves everything (i.e., he consumes nothing). T invests the
$100,000 of wages in the stock, selling the investment for $200,000 at the
end of year 02. 141 The $200,000 proceeds are fully taxable since they will be
consumed (not reinvested). T pays $100,000 tax, leaving $100,000 for consumption.142 The equal results under the wage and consumption tax illustrate the cash flow tax's implicit exemption of investment return in certain
circumstances. 143
Finally, compare the hybrid approach. T owes $50,000 tax on the wages
in year 01 even though he is saving. If T limited his stock investment to the
remaining $50,000 of after-tax wages, T would have significantly less proceeds available for consumption than the $100,000 under the cash flow and
wage taxes. This would occur since (i) the stock investment would be sold
for $100,000, while (ii) the stock return in excess of the ten percent risk-free
rate (i.e., $45,000 of the $50,000 gain) would be taxed under the adjusted
cash flow component of the hybrid approach. 144
A conceptual understanding of the cash flow tax's implicit risky return
exemption highlights, however, that such significant decrease can be
avoided under the hybrid approach. 145 In contrast to the wage tax, the fifty
percent cash flow tax required T to share half the stock gain with the government. T negated this formal tax collection, however, by doubling the
risky stock investment from $50,000 (under the wage tax) to $100,000 under the cash flow tax. While the consumption tax reduced T's after-tax
profit share to fifty percent of the pretax gain (100% - 50% tax rate), doubling the investment generated twice as much pretax gain. 146 T similarly can
141.
This assumes that T's investment of $100,000, rather than $50,000, does not affect the pricing of
the investment. The increased demand for risky assets relative to the wage tax, however, arguably would
increase the purchase price of risky assets. The extent of such pricing change is uncertain, however,
since investors not subject to the U.S. taxing regime (for example, foreigners, tax exempts) would not
adjust their portfolios in response to the U.S. tax. Terrence R. Chorvat, Apologia for the Double Taxation of Corporate Income, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. (forthcoming 2003). In addition, some U.S. taxpayers will not increase their risky investments (relative to the wage tax). See discussion infra note 147.
142.
Tax= $200,000 x 0.5 = $100,000. Consumption= $200,000 - $100,000 tax.
143.
Equal results will not always occur. The most significant difference occurs under progressive
rates. See discussion infra concerning Example 8; see also discussion infra note 147, for other reasons
why the implicit exemption might fail.
144.
The risk-free return on the $50,000 investment would be only $5000 ($50,000 x 10%). Technically, the $100,000 stock proceeds would be included in the base; the deductible basis offset account
would be only $55,000 ($50,000 x 1.1).
145.
This insight follows from the recent literature explaining why the income tax's excess theoretic
burden, relative to the cash flow consumption tax, generally is imposed only on the risk-free rate of
return. See Bankman & Griffith, supra note 58; Cunningham, supra note 38; Warren, supra note 54; see
also discussion supra concerning Example 5. The hybrid approach analysis differs from the income tax
analysis, however, in that the hybrid approach provides an exemption for the risk-free rate of return
(through the interest adjustment to the basis offset account). As discussed above, this exemption makes
the hybrid approach a consumption tax equivalent.
146.
While a fifty percent tax rate was used for ease of exposition, the analysis remains true for other
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negate the tax collection under the fifty percent hybrid tax by doubling his
stock investment to $100,000. 147
While T has only $50,000 of after-tax wages under the hybrid approach,
T nonetheless can increase his risky investment to $100,000 by borrowing
or using other assets. in the first instance, assume T makes this portfolio
adjustment by borrowing $50,000 at the ten percent risk-free rate. (Subpart
IV.D.2 below discusses the possibility that T's borrowing rate would exceed
the risk-free rate.) Like the cash flow tax, T sells the stock for $200,000. T
owes the lender $55,000, including the $5,000 interest. T owes the government $45,000 under the adjusted cash flow component of the hybrid tax: the
fifty percent tax rate multiplied by the excess of (i) the $200,000 stock proceeds over (ii) total deductions of $110,000 ($55,000 debt repayment plus
the $55,000 basis offset account). 148 This leaves T with the same $100,000
of after-tax consumption as under the wage and cash flow taxes. 149
The following example reintroduces progressive rates into the analysis.
This example demonstrates how the three taxes can reach very different
results under a progressive rate system.
Example 8: T receives a $100,000 salary on each of 12/31/01 and
12/31/02. T invests all after-tax wages from 01 for one year in a
very risky stock that quadruples in value as of one year later. The
tax rate is fifty percent for amounts up to, and including, $100,000;
additional amounts are taxed at a sixty percent rate. T consumes all
available funds on 12/31/02.

Under the stand-alone wage tax, T pays $50,000 tax in year 01 on the
$100,000 of wages, leaving $50,000 for investment in the risky stock. T
tax rates. More generally, in order to achieve the wage tax results, T should increase his risky stock
investment under the cash flow tax by a multiplier equal to 1/(1 - tax rate). E.g., a fifty percent tax rate
requires doubling the investment amount since 1/(1 - .5) = 2.0.
147.
Some taxpayers might fail to increase their portfolios in response to the tax, perhaps failing to
understand the ramifications of the government's co-investment. Such taxpayers do not necessarily face
an excess tax burden under the consumption taxes relative to the wage tax, however. For the same
amount of investment, the taxpayer has a lower risk of loss since investment losses on risky assets reduce the tax payments under the consumption taxes, but not the wage tax. In effect, the government
provides implicit insurance against the risk of loss. A similar point can be made about the income tax.
See Chorvat; supra note 141; see also, Fried, supra note 60, at 988-89. This assumes that the loss is
usable under the hybrid approach, the cash flow tax, and the income tax. The cash flow tax provides the
greatest assurance in this regard since any loss will reduce the proceeds available for consumption,
thereby reducing the tax bill. Compare the discussion of how the taxpayer might have unusable tax
losses under the hybrid and/or income taxes at notes 172-79 and 205. In this sense, the cash flow tax has
a comparative advantage since it allows for greater portfolio adjustments. On ihe other hand, greater
portfolio adjustments might increase the purchase price of risky assets, imposing an implicit tax. See
discussion supra note 141. Furthermore, even a partial ability to use losses reduces the risk on risky
investments.
148.
Debt repayments generally are deductible under the cash flow component. See discussion supra
note 10. The basis offset account equals the $50,000 saved wages plus the ten percent risk-free return
thereon for one year. $50,000 x 1.1 $55,000. Tax = 0.5 x [$200,000 - ($55,000 + $55,000)] = 0.5 x
$90,000 =$45,000.
149.
$200,000 stock proceeds - ($55,000 debt repayment+ $45,000 taxes)= $100,000.

=
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owes no tax when the stock is sold for $200,000 ($50,000 x 4). T pays
$50,000 tax on the year 02 wages, generating additional after-tax funds of
$50,000. T therefore has $250,000 available for consumption in year 02.
Under the cash flow tax, T purchases $100,000 of stock on 12/31/01
since no tax was owed at that time. T has $500,000 of pretax funds on
12/31/02: (i) $100,000 of new wages plus (ii) $400,000 ($100,000 x 4) of
stock sale proceeds. T owes $290,000 tax under the progressive rate structure, 150 leaving only $210,000 for consumption.
Under the hybrid approach, T owes $50,000 tax in year 01 on the
wages. Similar to Example 7, T should increase his risky investment to
$100,000. Therefore, assume again that T borrows $50,000 at the ten percent risk-free rate. At the end of year 02, T has pretax funds of $445,000:
the same $500,000 calculated under the cash flow tax less the $55,000 debt
repayment. T owes tax of $224,000 of tax under the progressive rate structure, leaving $221,000 for consumption. 151
To summarize the results, the wage tax left T with the most consumption ($250,000). There was no progressivity burden since the wage tax excluded the entire investment return from its base. In sharp contrast, the cash
flow tax left T with the least consumption ($210,000). The higher progressive rate applied to the risky return, the saved wages, and the risk-free retum.152 The hybrid approach left T with a moderate consumption amount
($221,000); only the risky return was subject to the progressive rate. 153
As discussed above, the consumption tax derives significant support
from its perceived investment return exemption. The wage tax therefore
might appear to have greater (consumption tax) consensus potential than
either the cash flow or hybrid approaches. The wage tax, however, goes too
far in its direct exemption of all investment return. Even those favoring a
consumption tax in its own right, and not as a replacement for the flawed
income tax, often do not rely solely on the implicit savings exemption.
Separately, by ultimately collecting tax on all resources when consumed, a
consumption tax arguably satisfies an "ability to pay" criteria. 154 A related
articulation focuses on the correlation between tax collections and the actual
standard of living under a consumption tax. By ignoring all actual investment return, a wage tax can deviate significantly from these desires. Pro150.
(0.5 X $100,000) + (0.6 X $400,000).
151.
Tax base= $390,000. {$100,000 wages+ [$400,000 - ($55,000 basis offset account+ $55,000
debt repayment]). Tax= (.5 x $100,000) + (.6 x $290,000) = $224,000.
152.
The higher rate, by 10% (60% - 50%), applied to the $100,000 saved wages plus the entire
$300,000 gain. 10% x $400,000 = $40,000 progressive burden. (There was additional consumption of
$40,000 under the wage tax relative to the cash flow tax: $250,000 - $210,000.)
153.
The higher rate, by ten percent, applied only to the stock gain in excess of the risk-free rate
($10,000 of the $300,000 stock gain correlates to the risk-free rate; $290,000 was the risky premium). $
290,000 x 10% = $29,000. (There was additional consumption of $29,000 under the wage tax relative to
the cash flow tax: $250,000 - $221,000.)
154.
Ability to pay has been criticized for its theoretical imprecision; i.e., ability to pay is not selfdefining. See, e.g., Daniel N. Shaviro, Commentary: Inequality, Wealth, and Endowment, 53 TAX L.
REV. 397, 399 (2000). Nonetheless, ability to pay continues to frame the debate and seems to require, at
a minimum, that tax be collected on available resources at some particular time.
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gressive rates enhance the objection. As demonstrated by Example 8, consumption of extraordinary investment returns on modest wages would avoid
all progressivity (consider also a lottery winner). 155 Thus, even some favoring a consumption tax in theory desire progressivity on risky returns. 156
A wage tax would have an even more difficult time satisfying those
supporting the consumption tax only as a replacement for the flawed income
tax. Shifting the tax collection timing from realization to consumption is a
relatively minor change for an income tax advocate, one more easily accepted in order to avoid the realization problems. In contrast, shifting to a
system which completely ignores actual investment outcomes is a much
more dramatic change. 157
At the other end of the spectrum, the cash flow tax imposed a progressivity burden not only on the risky premium, but also the saved wages and
the risk-free retilrn. However, deferring consumption of saved wages from a
light consumption year to a heavy consumption year does not increase one's
overall standard of living. A similar argument can be made to the extent the
taxpayer's investment return is limited to the normal risk-free rate of retum.158 Thus, the cash flow tax imposed an excessive progressivity burden
even taking into account the standard of living desire. In favorable contrast,
the hybrid approach moderately imposed a progressivity burden only on the
risky premium. The hybrid approach's consensus promise is evidenced by
its simultaneous (i) imposition of a progressivity burden when risky returns
materially enhance the living standard, in favorable contrast to the wage
tax, 159 and (ii) avoidance of the cash flow tax's undesirable progressivity
burden on the deferred consumption of saved wages and risk-free returns. 160
155.
A consumption tax would collect significant tax where lottery winnings funded heavy consumption. In contrast, the wage tax would collect tax only on the lighter wages.
156.
See, e.g., Rakowski, supra note 60, at 354 (discussing support for progressivity on "risky investment income"); William D. Andrews, Fairness and the Personal Income Tax: A Reply to Professor
Warren, 88 HARV. L. REV. 947, 954-55 (1975).
157.
See, e.g., Graetz, supra note 92, at 1600-01. The consumption tax's potential implicit exemption
of investment return might suggest the difference is merely in appearance. As shown herein, however,
such implicit exemption can fail under a progressive rate structure. The after-tax results under a wage
and consumption tax also might differ for reasons distinct from progressive rates. In particular, the
consumption taxes do not implicitly exempt inframarginal returns. Taxpayers cannot un.do the explicit
tax collection by increasing inframarginal investments since they are limited by above-market opportunities (after adjustment for risk). As a related practical matter, the difficulty in distinguishing inframarginal
opportunities from earned income highlights a more general classification problem under the wage tax.
Any labor income not properly classified as such under the wage tax avoids all tax, placing tremendous
pressure on separating the labor and capital components. Consider receipts from technological inventions like Microsoft DOS, mineral deposits such as a successful oil venture, increased rental value of
land, or a successful advertising campaign. BRADFORD, supra note 127, at 130; Bradford, supra note 99,
at 387; Weisbach, supra note 89, at 608 (noting problem, especially on patents); see also discussion
supra note 147 (failure of taxpayers to adjust their portfolios); discussion supra note 141 (potential
pricing changes).
158.
One might question drawing the line at precisely the risk-free rate of return, rather than the riskfree rate plus a small percentage. Nonetheless, it provides a rough rule of thumb to separate out those
returns that materially alter one's standard of living. See Rakowski, supra note 60, at 354.
159.
While this was a truncated two-year example, the point applies as well when a longer-term
extraordinary return materially increases the living standard over an extended period.
160.
Thus, not only does the hybrid approach collect tax on the significant investment return, the
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Finally, the hybrid approach has further responsiveness to any residual
concerns of potential excess progressivity. As demonstrated above, risky
returns can bear a progressivity burden under both the cash flow and hybrid
approaches. Therefore, a bunching problem could arise under the hybrid
approach as well as the cash flow tax if heavy risky returns were disproportionately consumed in a single year.
Such concerns should be less pronounced under the hybrid approach
than the cash flow tax for several reasons. First, as evidenced by Example 8,
the hybrid approach reduces the bunching problem through its exclusion of
the original investment amount and the risk-free return. In addition, the hybrid approach's flexibility provides a second source of protection. Taxpayers could be provided an election to decline the use of available basis offset
account balances in any year. Such unused amounts would carry forward
indefinitely, with interest, as per the usual rules. This election would allow
taxpayers to save their basis offset accounts for unusually heavy consumption year(s) funded by risky returns; in return, they would voluntarily pay
taxes in lower-rate years on consumption funded from savings. 161 Finally,
consideration could be given to a relatively short-term averaging provision
applicable in the year of death, looking back three to four years. As discussed above, a short-term averaging provision by itself inadequately responds to the deeper bunching problem under the cash flow tax. 162 Nonetheless, a relatively modest averaging provision might work well in conjunction with the hybrid approach's other, self-contained, protections. 163
2. Non-Progressive Burdens under the Hybrid Approach

The hybrid approach might impose an excess burden on risky returns
relative to the cash flow tax for two reasons. The first relates to the assumption above that T could increase his risky investments by borrowing at the

burden also cannot be eliminated through portfolio adjustments when the standard of living increases
(similar to the cash flow tax). Such inclusion (with potential progressivity on actual consumption levels)
placates ability-to-pay objections to the wage tax (which fails to collect any tax at all on significant
investment returns). This recognizes the desire to have actual standards of living impact the progressivity
burden. On the other hand, the hybrid approach's exclusion of saved wages plus the risk-free return
helps to protect against undesirable progressivity burdens attributable to unequal spending from year to
year.
161.
This would provide taxpayers a structured way to obtain averaging. See discussion supra notes
92-94 and accompanying text (for the difficulties of averaging provisions). If such election were not
provided, sophisticated taxpayers might attempt to achieve a de facto election by manipulating the character of their income (i.e., converting investment return to wages would allow them to carry forward the
exclusionary amount). Any risk that the additional carry forward could not be utilized in the future
would be knowingly borne by the taxpayer. See also supra notes 175-76 and accompanying text (for a
more general discussion regarding the possibility of an unused basis offset account).
162.
Recall the potential excess burden on wages saved numerous years ago.· See discussion supra
notes 86-95 and accompanying text. As discussed therein, a more responsive long-term averaging provision is more contentious as it raises deeper administrative and over breadth concerns.
163.
Successful resolution of the contentious averaging issue is a lesser requirement for the hybrid
approach than the cash flow tax, given the hybrid approach's self-contained responses to the bunching
problem. See discussion supra note 95.
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risk-free rate. Assuming initially a flat-rate structure, an excess burden
would be imposed on T under the hybrid approach where T's portfolio adjustment required borrowing at a rate above the risk-free rate. This results
conceptually since T receives compensation on the corresponding basis offset account at only the risk-free rate. 164 No such burden arises under the
cash flow tax since T can make the necessary portfolio adjustment by investing the full pretax wages.
The following factors, however, should minimize this excess tax concern under the hybrid approach. 165 First, the risk-free rate provides the precise adjustment to the extent the taxpayer would have purchased some riskfree assets under the cash flow (or wage) tax. In such cases, taxpayers need
not borrow to increase their risky investments under the hybrid approach.
Instead, taxpayers can use the cash that would have funded risk-free assets
under the cash flow tax. 166 Second, taxpayers might be able to offset the
explicit tax collection by purchasing riskier assets, rather than purchasing an
increased amount of the same risky investment. 167 Borrowing would not be
necessary for such strategy. Third, explicit individualized borrowing for
investment provides collateral that should reduce the actual borrowing
rate. 168 Separately, the basis offset account can be conceptualized as a loan

164.
That is, compared to the cash flow tax, T pays tax earlier but receives interest at the risk-free
rate. If the earlier tax collection forces T to borrow under the hybrid approach (to match the risky investment amount under the cash flow tax), the two systems will deviate unless T's borrowing rate on his
loan matches the interest paid on the offsetting basis offset account balance. Recall Example 7 that
assumed a flat fifty percent tax rate. T's $100,000 consumption under the cash flow tax matched the
wage tax results (with its direct exemption of investment return). This resulted since T invested the full
$100,000 of pretax wages in the risky stock. The hybrid approach matches the cash flow tax assuming T
can borrow at the ten percent risk-free rate (as per Example 7). If Ts borrowing rate exceeded ten percent, however, T would have less than $100,000 consumption since T's after-tax interest expense would
increase. For instance, if T borrowed at a twenty percent rate, T would have only $97,500 consumption.
T would owe (i) $60,000 to the lender ($50,000 x 1.2) and (ii) $42,500 to the government {50% x
[$200,000 stock proceeds - ($60,000 to lender+ $55,000 basis offset account)]}. $200,000 stock proceeds - ($60,000 + $42,500) =$97,500.
165.
See also Engler & Knoll, supra note 50, at 72-73 n.93 for the suggestion that the cash flow tax,
rather than the hybrid approach, has the more significant interest rate imprecision. In particular, a consumption tax can be viewed as an implicit accrual tax on all wealth with an implicit exemption for the
risk-free return. Under this conceptualization, the cash flow tax improperly allows taxpayers to borrow,
implicitly, at the understated risk-free rate in a greater number of circumstances. Relative to the cash
flow tax, the hybrid approach appropriately denies the below-market loan to taxpayers on saved wages.
166.
Consider again Example 7, but now assume under the wage tax that T would invest only
$25,000 in the risky stock. The remaining $25,000 after-tax wages would have been invested in risk-free
treasury notes. Under the hybrid and cash flow taxes, T needs to increase his risky investments to
$50,000 (doubling the $25,000 risky investment he would have made under the wage tax). T no longer
would need to borrow under the hybrid approach to make the portfolio investment. Instead, he could
invest the full $50,000 of after-tax wages in the stock (effectively reducing his risk-free investments to
zero). Also see the comparable analysis of the income tax at Example 5.
167.
See, e.g., Cunningham, supra note 38, at 44 (taxpayers can adjust portfolio in many ways, including changing proportion of risky assets, borrowing, or simply finding riskier investments); see also
Chorvat, supra note 141. In addition, publicly traded options might provide some implicit borrowing
opportunities at approximately the risk-free rate. See RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS,
PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 605-09 (5th ed. 1996).
168.
See Engler, supra note 27, at 195. But see Cunningham, supra note 38, at 37 n.72 (stating that
margin loans to wealthy bear interest at rates ranging from .75% to 4% above the federal funds rate).
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from the taxpayer to the government. 169 Such conceptualization arguably
supports use of the government's borrowing rate, the risk-free rate, even if
the taxpayer incurs higher borrowing costs in making its investments. 170
Finally, the interest adjustment to the basis offset account could be increased to the risk-free rate plus a small percentage (in the range of one to
three percent). 171
As evidenced by the following example, the hybrid approach also could
impose an excess burden relative to the cash flow tax due to losses.
Example 9: T earns a $100,000 salary on 12/31/01. T invests all (after-tax) wages in a risky stock, which loses twenty percent of its
value over the one-year investment period. T consumes aJl available
proceeds on 12/31/02. The tax rate is a flat fifty percent.

Under the cash flow tax, T invests $100,000 in the stock, selling one
year later for $80,000. The $80,000 proceeds are taxable, leaving $40,000
of consumption. 172 Contrast the hybrid approach. First, recall that T increased the original stock investment to $100,000 by borrowing $50,000 (at
the ten percent risk-free rate) since T's after tax wages were only $50,000
under the hybrid approach. T would not owe any additional tax on the stock
sale for $80,000; both the $55,000 debt repayment and the $55,000 basis
offset account are deductible against the stock proceeds. 173 After using
$55,000 of the stock proceeds to repay the lender, T has only $25,000 cash
available for consumption, $15,000 less than under the cash flow tax.

169.
Recall the notion of the hybrid approach as an advance collection system vis-a-vis the cash flow
tax. As such, .tax is paid in advance under the hybrid approach with the interest adjustment on the basisoffset account compensating for the advance payment.
170.
See Michael Knoll, A Primer on Prejudgment Interest, 75 TEX. L. REV. 293, 308-11 (1996)
(theorizing that even though the lending· arrangement is involuntary, prejudgment interest in litigation
context should be assessed at the borrowing rate of the defendant-the implicit borrower). Some issues
arise in using the government's risk-free rate in the hybrid approach context since (i) a portion of the
basis recovery account might expire unused (see infra notes 175-76 and accompanying text), (ii) the
basis might not be used for many years, (iii) tax law changes might deprive taxpayers recovery of the
basis offset account, and (iv) tax rates might change. The following responses minimize these imperfections. The hybrid approach minimizes the first issue by netting all of the taxpayer's investments, plus
unusable amounts could be reimbursed. See infra notes 175-79 and accompanying text. Further minimization occurs if a wealth transfer tax is integrated into the hybrid approach, since the basis offset account
could be used at death to reduce the wealth transfer base. See discussion supra note 88 and accompanying text. A blended risk-free rate (equally weighting short-term, mid-term, and long-term risk-free rates)
would address the second concern. Fair transition allowance for existing tax basis in the move to a consumption tax responds to the third issue by providing greater comfort in relying on tax benefits going
forward. See Sarkar & Zodrow, supra note 129, at 363 (lack of transition relief has cost of offsetting
expectations regarding future tax policy).
171.
Only a slight bump should be considered given the arguments above favoring the risk-free rate.
Compare the provision of interest to taxpayers on refunds at the government's short-term risk-free rate
plus three percent. I.R.C. § 662l(a)(l) (2003). Utilizing individualized borrowing rates raises administrative issues (for example, determining which debt was incurred in response to the hybrid approach's
tax on saved wages).
172.
This is the same result as under the wage tax. Under the wage tax, T invests only $50,000 in the
stock. The twenty percent decline leaves $40,000.
173.
Both calculations are $50,000 x 1.1.
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However, T's remaining basis-offset account of $30,000 should minimize concerns over this shortfall. 174 The remaining account balance allows
T to avoid $15,000 of tax on $30,000 of other consumption. Even if T does
not have other current consumption funded from savings, the unused basis
offset account carries forward. The interest adjustment protects against time
value of money dilution. 175 Thus, the loss scenario primarily is problematic
only where T's portfolio over time provides an overall rate of return less
than the risk-free rate. 176 If so, T's savings available for consumption would
be less than the basis offset account carry forward, thereby negating the
account's full value. 177 The historic tendency of risky portfolios to provide
returns in excess of the risk-free rate (over sufficient time frames), however,
should reduce this concern. 178 Finally, compensating taxpayers for unusable
basis offset account balances could provide additional comfort. 179
In sum, the hybrid approach could impose an excess burden relative to
the cash flow tax for two reasons under a flat rate structure. As discussed
above, however, a variety of factors should minimize such concerns. In addition, Subpart IV.F summarizes how the advantages of the hybrid approach
relative to the cash flow tax outweigh these concerns. 180

174.
The tax base is calculated as the excess of (i) the $80,000 stock proceeds less (ii) the sum of (iii)
the $55,000 debt repayment plus the $55,000 basis offset account. The deductions therefore exceed the
inclusion by $30,000, creating a deduction carry forward of $30,000. Alternatively, the $55,000 debt
repayment reduces the taxable stock proceeds to $25,000 ($80,000 - $55,000). Only $25,000 of the
$55,000 basis offset account is needed to offset that remaining amount, thereby leaving an unused basis
offset account of $30,000.
175.
See supra note 28 and accompanying text (discussing the principle of the time value of money).
176.
But see discussion supra notes 164-71 and accompanying text (regarding possible understatement of the interest adjustment where the taxpayer incurs borrowing costs).
177.
The basis-offset account only has value to the extent it can be deducted against savings withdrawals for consumption. Taxpayers also could receive less than full value if the basis offset account
were utilized in a tax year where the rate was lower than the rate imposed on the saved wages in the
wage year. Providing an election to taxpayers to defer use of their basis offset account would help to
minimize such concerns. See discussion supra note 161 and accompanying text.
178.
Risk-free assets by definition provide a return equal to the risk-free rate. Risky assets have an
expected return in excess of the risk-free rate due to the premium for bearing risk. BREALEY & MYERS,
supra note 167, at ch. 8. Thus, this possibility of unused basis should be a lesser concern under the
hybrid approach than a similar concern under a suggested cash flow transition approach that would block
the use of transition deductions against savings withdrawals. In that context, unusable basis could arise
even where the taxpayer earned a portfolio return equal to, or greater than, the risk-free rate. See discussion supra note 131.
179.
For instance, the government could compensate the estates of taxpayers who die with unused
basis offset accounts. Waiting until death has some appeal since death conclusively establishes how
much, if any, of the basis offset account turns out to be unusable. While an earlier payment also has
appeal (to get cash directly into the taxpayer's hands), it raises an administrative issue as to when taxpayers should be allowed to convert their basis offset accounts to cash. Another complexity concerns the
amount of compensation to be provided for unused basis offset account balances. The theoretically
correct response arguably would look to the tax rate that applied to the original saved wage amount.
Administrative concerns counsel in favor of a standard rate structure. Again, taxpayers would be compensated for the time value of money through the interest adjustment to the basis offset account.
180.
In addition, as discussed supra in notes 110-14, the likely "tax prepaid" treatment of certain
consumer debt would allow some limited tax minimization strategies under the cash flow tax. Thus,
taxpayer burdens under the cash flow tax also could vary in accordance with individualized borrowing
rates. See also discussion irifra notes 204-05 and accompanying text (regarding how the income tax has
similar excess tax possibilities).
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E. Complexity Issues
This Subpart compares the complexity of the different taxes. The hybrid
approach's dual application (to both wages and saving withdrawals) initially
might appear significantly more complex than the single-application cash
flow tax. 181 For instance, the basis offset account, with the interest adjustment, coordinates the hybrid approach's two components. A similar mechanism would be needed under the cash flow tax, however, to address savings
held at transition, albeit for a more limited purpose. 182 Furthermore, tax collection on savings withdrawals has relatively greater significance under the
cash flow tax, necessitating additional enforcement efforts. 183 The cash flow
tax also would generate additional complexity to the extent it adopted extensive averaging provisions. 184
Consider also the areas of reduced complexity under the hybrid approach relative to the current income tax. 185 Under current law, saved wages
generally are taxed on receipt even if saved. Since investment income is
calculated separately for each asset, taxpayers must track their basis in each
asset. In contrast, the hybrid approach would have a single basis account for
all investments. 186 The tax return itself would serve a valuable recordkeeping function by tracking all unrecovered basis for all investment assets
in a single aggregated account. 187 As a related point, partial asset disposi181.
A stand-alone wage tax is relatively attractive on administrative grounds. As discussed supra in
note 157 and accompanying text, however, the wage tax is unacceptable for other reasons. In addition,
the wage tax would require additional policing efforts on wage characterization given the greater pressure on the wage/investment distinction.
182.
See discussion supra Part IV.C. While the provision would have a more limited scope, complexities related to the determination of the interest rate adjustment would be comparable.
183.
See discussion supra notes 119-21 and accompanying text.
184.
See discussion supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text.
185.
The hybrid approach might add complexity for taxpayers who save small amounts solely
through simple savings arrangements, such as interest-bearing bank accounts. It is these taxpayers,
however, who currently face relatively greater burdens on their investment income since such interest
income does not receive either the deferral or preferential rate benefits. Most of the simplifications
relative to current law stem from the cash flow treatment of investments. See, e.g., Andrews, supra note
70, at 1152-53; Graetz, supra note 92, at 1610.
186.
As discussed below, separate basis record keeping might be necessary for consumer durables/homes. This does not distinguish the cash flow tax from the hybrid approach. As discussed at notes
111-12 and accompanying text, the treatment of consumer durables should be similar under the two
forms of consumption taxation.
More generally, the need for separate basis calculations might appear prominent if wealth transfers
were not treated as consumption. If that were the case, the transferor's basis offset account might appear
artificially high absent a reduction equal to the specific basis of the transferred property. As discussed
supra in notes 86-90, independent reasons support the inclusion of wealth transfers as consumption to
the transferor. Even if wealth transfers were not treated as consumption, the need for widespread specific
basis record keeping could be avoided by providing that a transferor's basis offset account would be
decreased by the value of any transferred property. More narrow rules could be considered to address
potential under valuation situations, for example, high-basis assets likely to be transferred at understated
values. The hybrid approach need not eliminate all valuation concerns; the cash flow tax and current law
also present valuation issues on wealth transfers. See, e.g., supra note 89; I.R.C. § 1015 (2003).
187.
Under current law, taxpayers might have uncertainty as to their actual basis in each separate
investment asset where the asset was acquired long ago. Additional uncertainties could arise where the
asset was acquired in separate transactions over time and/or where a portion of the asset was sold at
different times.
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tions raise complexity issues under the income tax; how much of the taxpayer's total purchase price should be allowed to offset the partial sales
proceeds. 188
The hybrid approach' s cash flow treatment of investments also eliminates other complexities under the realization-based income tax. Under current law, sophisticated taxpayers attempt to (i) convert ordinary income into
lower-rate capital gains and/or (ii) avoid the realization tax by transferring
the economic burdens/benefits of ownership without an actual sale. 189 This
creates increasingly complicated situations, as current law must police the
artificial ordinary/capital and realization distinctions. 190 Additional issues
arise under the realization income tax regarding the propriety of taxing realized gain where the proceeds consist of either comparable property or the
buyer's note. Current deferral provisions for qualifying installment sales
and "like-kind" exchanges present additional complexities. 191
A final point concerns in-year calculations. Application of the hybrid
approach's interest adjustment to investments/withdrawals occurring within
a tax year raises complexity issues. In theory, interest should run from the
tax payment date on saved wages until the savings withdrawal date, thereby
raising administrative issues. However, comparable in-year complexities
arise under both the cash flow tax and income tax. For instance, year-end
savings followed by a withdrawal early the following year raises an interestfree deferral possibility under the cash flow tax, absent specific tracking of
the saving and/or withdrawal dates. 192 Furthermore, as discussed below,
188.
For instance, under current law, taxpayers selling only a portion of shares held in a corporation
or mutual fund company can claim to have sold the specific shares purchased at the highest price. This
reduces the reported gain by increasing the portion of the overall basis allowed as an offset. Critics argue
the provision is too generous. Compare the Clinton administration's more complicated provision allowing basis recovery equal to the average cost basis in all shares. White House Statutory Language; Title
IX, Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1996, § 9511, Subtitle E: Corporate Reforms and Other Revenue
Provisions, 96 TNT 56-6, Mar. 20, 1996. Cash flow taxation of investments eliminates this arbitrary
distinction. Partial sales proceeds are included only to the extent they are consumed rather than reinvested.
189.
For a straightforward attempt to transfer the economic burdens and benefits without an actual
sale, consider the short against the box. A taxpayer holding appreciated stock (e.g., 100 shares), borrows
100 other shares in the same company and sells "short" the borrowed shares (while retaining his own
actual shares). Technically the taxpayer retains ownership in his actual shares although he eliminates the
economic benefits and burdens of ownership (since any gain (loss) on his own "long" stock position is
perfectly offset by loss (gain) on the short stock position). The short against the box strategy was eventually shut down by I.R.C. § 1259 (2002). Nonetheless, it illustrates how some taxpayers inevitably find
the gaps in the tax law.
190.
See I.RC. § 1258 (treating certain gains on the sale of capital assets as ordinary income); id. §
1259 (forcing gain recognition in the absence of actual sale in certain cases); see also supra note 46.
191.
I.R.C. § 453 (installment sales); id. § 1031 (like-kind exchanges). There are additional "nonrecognition" provisions. E.g., I.RC. § 354 (stock exchanges which qualify as a "reorganization"). In the
other direction, current law occasionally requires the reporting of income even before actual sale. E.g.,
the "original issue discount" rules at I.RC. § 1271. These divergent tax rules add complexity; i.e., the
rules must be applied to relevant transactions and taxpayers analyze possible restructurings to avoid the
rules.
192.
For instance, deferring consumption from the last day of year O1 to the first day of year 02
defers the tax liability from year O1 to year 02 absent specific tracing rules. (The benefit of any such
deferral turns on the workings of the estimated payment regime, which also depends on the degree of
complexity it undertakes in tracking the specific timing of transactions within a year.) Another in-year
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accounting conventions could address the in-year complexity issues under
the hybrid approach.
The hybrid approach also eliminates an area of in-year complexity under the income tax. Because a decline in asset value constitutes an expense,
investments in wasting assets require an annual depreciation allowance under an income tax. In-year difficulties arise under the income tax since, in
theory, depreciation allowances should begin upon the placement of property in service. 193 Given the immediate deduction for the entire purchase
price, the hybrid approach, like the cash flow tax, eliminates the need for
depreciation. Separately, the current income tax treatment of this comparable in-year difficulty suggests one way to handle the in-year interest calculations under the hybrid approach. General accounting conventions could
ha.lance administrative concerns and precision, with an override provided
for abusive cases. For instance, one such convention under the hybrid approach treats all savings withdrawals as made in the middle of the tax year,
absent significantly disproportionate early-year withdrawals. 194
problem arises under the cash flow tax if wage withholding is maintained. While savers are entitled to
refunds of any such withheld taxes, over taxation results, absent interest payments for the time lapse
between the withholding and refund dates. See discussion supra note 107. Another problem arises under
the cash flow tax if tax rates are expressed on a tax-inclusive basis (i.e., no deduction for taxes paid). In
this instance, taxpayers who defer paying taxes on year 01 consumption to year 02 reduce the tax cost
(deferring the tax payment allows an extra deductible investment in year 01). While a tax-exclusive rate
responds to such concern, this raises a potential offsetting optics concern since the tax-exclusive rate
appears as a significantly higher stated rate. Graetz, supra note 92, at 1583. With some additional complexity, an alternative approach might treat unpaid taxes at year-end as savings withdrawals.
· Similarly, both the cash flow tax and the hybrid approach need to protect against tax avoidance possibilities involving below-market loans between related parties. A below-market loan from father to
child appears to raise a unique problem under the hybrid approach since, absent a protective provision,
phantom deductions would accrue to the lender while the loan is outstanding. A similar issue also arises
under the cash flow tax, since the transaction may generate a current "investment" deduction. Further,
below-market loans raise issues under the income tax. For the current law response, see I.R.C. § 7872
(2002) (which can be used under the consumption tax systems, with appropriate modifications).
193.
I.R.C. § 168(d)(l)-(2) (2002) finesses this complexity by deeming depreciable property, other
than realty, as purchased in the middle of the year. This effectively allows six months of depreciation
allowances for the initial year, regardless of the specific day within the year that the property is placed in
service. This six-month allowance is overridden where substantial purchases of such depreciable property occur in the last three months of the taxable year. Id. § 168(d)(3). The depreciation rules also finesse
complexities in determining actual declines in property by making assumptions about useful lives and
value decreases. See id. § 168(b),(c). For additional in-year complexities under current law, see the
current estimated tax payment rules at I.R.C. § 6654 (2002) (under which tax payments for a given year
can be made as late as April 15 of the following year).
194.
Compare the current depreciation rules discussed supra note 193. Under a mid-year convention,
savings withdrawals are deemed made on June 30. As such, in determining basis offset account balances
available against current year savings withdrawals, the balance carry forward preliminarily receives a
sixcmonth adjustment. Any remaining balance (after reduction for the current year's use) then receives
the remaining six-month adjustment. A mid-point rule for taxes paid during the current year deems taxes
paid in August/September (since taxes might not be paid until April 15 of the following year, assuming
retention of the current timing rules). If so, new account balances receive only three to four months of
interest adjustment in the year of creation. While a mid-point approach generally minimizes imprecision,
potential manipulations (like disproportjonate withdrawals early in the year) suggest consideration of
stricter rules. Possibilities include: (i) specific disallowance provisions (such as reducing the in-year
interest adjustment where significantly disproportionate withdrawals occur early in the year), or (ii) more
general in-year interest disallowance (such as no interest adjustment on carry forward amounts used
during year against saving withdrawals, and/or no in-year interest on new account balances). Assuming a
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In sum, the hybrid approach adds some complexity in certain areas relative to either the cash flow or income tax. Given the offsetting areas of
complexity reduction under the hybrid approach, the overall complexity
case is far less certain. The remaining excess complexity, if any, should be
balanced against the hybrid approach's other comparative advantages,
which are summarized in the next Subpart.
F. Summary of the Hybrid Approach's Appeal

This Subpart summarizes the consensus potential of the hybrid approach. Subpart IV .F. 1 discusses why the hybrid approach should appeal to
those favoring, at least in theory, a consumption tax. Subpart IV.F.2 explains why the hybrid approach also should appeal to theoretic income tax
proponents.
1. Appeal to Theoretic Consumption Tax Advocates

Subparts IV.A and D highlighted one reason why a progressive cash
flow consumption tax might have difficulty in satisfying even those who
favor, in theory, a consumption tax. The desired consumption tax system
must heed the occasionally conflicting desires to collect tax (i) independent
of saving decisions and (ii) in accordance with the standard of living. The
hybrid approach strikes a more desirable balance than the cash flow tax
between the inevitable conflicts of these two competing consumption tax
desires. In favorable contrast to the cash flow tax, the hybrid approach incorporates savings neutrality when the living standard is not at issue; i.e.,
the hybrid approach avoids imposing a progressivity burden on the deferred
consumption of saved wages and the risk-free return thereon. On the other
hand, the hybrid approach imposes a progressivity burden on savings when
the living standard becomes relevant; for example, where significant risky
returns fund a materially enhanced lifestyle. 195 Related thereto, bunching

tax-inclusive rate, with no deduction for taxes paid, specific concern arises regarding taxpayers who
defer payment of current-year taxes to the following year. Such deferral could free up assets for additional investments, thereby overstating the year-end basis offset account on which interest accrues the
following year. In response, any current-year taxes not paid by year end could be deemed made from
savings withdrawals on January I of the new year or December 31 of the prior year. The January I
approach limits any excess interest accruals to the partial in-year adjustment, if any, for the prior year.
The December 31 approach should eliminate any excess interest adjustment, albeit with some additional
complexity (i.e., deeming savings withdrawals in the prior year requires an offsetting current year deduction). Separately, care is needed where offsetting withdrawals and savings occur on different days of the
same year.
195.
Thus, the hybrid approach imposes a progressivity burden on both high wages and high investment returns. Some consumption tax proponents vacillate between progressivity on wages versus investment return. E.g., Rakowski, supra note 60; compare Bradford, supra note 99, at 384-85 (analyzing
the "X-tax" which imposes progressivity only on wages), with DAVID F. BRADFORD ET AL., BLUEPRINTS
FOR BASIC TAX REFORM 122-23 (2d ed. 1984) (analyzing cash flow tax under which progressivity
generally applies at the time of consumption).
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concerns from risky returns are significantly narrower under the hybrid approach than the cash flow tax. 196
Potential consumption tax proponents also might object to a form of
consumption taxation, which raises serious implementation issues relative to
the current structure. By maintaining tax collections on saved wages, the
hybrid approach also responds to the transition, revenue, and tax avoidance/evasion concerns under the cash flow tax. 197
In sum, consumption tax proponents should favor the hybrid approach
over the cash flow tax due to these combined benefits, which outweigh the
hybrid approach's additional complexities, if any, and two possible areas of
excess tax. 198
2. Appeal to Theoretic Income Tax Proponents
As discussed in Part III, those favoring an income tax should consider
consumption taxation due to realization-based practical problems under the
income tax. Ultimate acceptance of consumption taxation by this group is,
however, contingent on comparable progressivity and the lack of offsetting
practical concerns. The hybrid approach satisfies these criteria as well.
The primary theoretic difference between the income tax and the consumption tax is the income tax's excess burden on the risk-free investment
return. In practice, however, the income tax unfairly taxes this relatively
minor component of investment return. Realization-based gaps enable certain taxpayers to avoid completely, or minimize, the tax on risk-free re196.
This occurs when high risky returns are consumed over a short time frame. The bunching concerns narrow under the hybrid approach since saved wages and the risk-free return thereon are excluded
from the adjusted cash flow base. Giving taxpayers control over the timing of such exclusionary deductions would further blunt any remaining bunching concerns under the hybrid approach. See discussion
supra notes 161-63 and accompanying text.
197.
A modified hybrid approach could more closely follow the cash flow tax on the progressivity
issue by giving a "tax paid credit" carry forward for taxes paid on saved wages (in lieu of the basis offset
account carry forward). This would appeal if the consumption tax consensus preferred the cash flow tax
on the progressivity issue yet wanted to incorporate the hybrid approach's responsiveness to the cash
flow tax's other impediments. Under this modified hybrid approach, a preliminary tax liability is calculated by applying the tax rates to the hybrid tax base without any basis offset account deduction. Taxpayers reduce the preliminary tax by the (unused) tax paid credit carry forward, which equals taxes
previously paid on saved wages, increased by an interest factor. Note that if the tax rate is expressed on a
tax inclusive basis, the tax paid credit amount must be added to the tax base.
198.
As discussed above in Subpart IV.D.2, this potential excess tax under the hybrid approach
relative to the cash flow tax arises where the risk-free rate: (i) exceeds the taxpayer's overall portfolio
return or (ii) is less than the interest rate incurred in making a portfolio adjustment. As discussed therein,
a variety of factors should narrow such excess tax concerns. In addition, the cash flow tax's undesirable
progressivity impact, as described above, presents a more general structural problem. Finally, in any
specific risky return case, the cash flow tax's excess progressivity burden could match or exceed any
potential excess burden under the hybrid approach. For instance, consider again the example in note 164
showing the hybrid approach's excess burden where T borrowed at twice the risk-free rate under a flat
fifty percent rate. Assume now that a higher sixty percent rate applies to amounts above $100,000. Ts
consumption under the hybrid approach remains $97,500 because Ts tax base in both years remains at
$100,000 or less. Under the cash flow tax, however, T faces the progressive rate when the asset is sold
for $200,000. Ts tax bill goes from $100,000 (.5 x $200,000) to $110,000 [(.5 x $100,000) + (.6 x
$100,000)]. Accordingly, Ts after-tax consumption decreases to $90,000. T therefore consumes more
under the hybrid approach notwithstanding the excess borrowing costs.
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turns. 199 Furthermore, these realization-based loopholes allow select taxpayers to reduce the tax burden on other income. 200 Therefore, even if one favors, in theory, a tax on the risk-free return, the hybrid approach should be
attractive. The hybrid approach removes what is, in practice, an inequitable
tax on risk-free returns. It also largely eliminates the spillover problems
affecting the remaining tax base. 201
The hybrid approach accomplishes this without sacrificing the income
tax's direct progressivity burden on high wage earners who spread consumption over a number of years. In addition, the hybrid approach imposes
progressivity on enhanced lifestyles funded by significant investment returns.
Finally, the hybrid approach's potential imperfections highlighted above
should not weaken its attractiveness to theoretic income tax proponents. The
income tax has comparable, if not greater, flaws in each such area. For instance, home acquisition indebtedness might present some tax deferral possibilities under the hybrid approach. 202 In favorable contrast to the deferral
strategies under current law, however, market-rate interest is charged for
such deferral under the hybrid approach. In addition, while taxpayers ulti199.
The realization income tax imposes the excess burden on risk-free returns only on those who
realize income before consumption. See discussion supra note 62 and accompanying text. In addition,
under current law, the attempted burden unfairly varies with the inflation rate. See Cunningham, supra
note 38, at 39-43.
200.
The direct realization problems include the interest-free deferral on unrealized gains and the
selective disposition of only loss assets. See Subpart ill.A. Indirect realization problems flow from the
reduced capital gains rate, primarily justified as a response to the lock-in issue under the realization
requirement. The lower capital gains rate not only reduces the burden on all qualifying investment returns, but also encourages "conversions" of ordinary rate income (such as labor and interest income) to
capital gains. See supra notes 42, 189-90 and accompanying text.
201.
The hybrid approach eliminates (i) selective loss realization since losses are not deductible (see
supra note 51 and accompanying text) and (ii) the leading justifications for the lower capital gains rate
under the income tax (see supra note 52 and accompanying text). While the hybrid approach taxes wages
when realized, the interest adjustment to the basis-offset account generally removes the timing significance of such realization. Some discontinuity will remain to the extent the risk-free rate is understated.
See supra notes 164-71 and accompanying text. Taxpayers planning to avoid the adjusted cash flow
component (for example, by expatriating) would benefit from avoiding wage realization. Nonetheless, as
discussed at supra note 121, the wage component provides extra protection. Separately, although progressive rates provide an incentive to avoid high-wage years, an equivalent concern arises under the
income tax. See supra note 105.
Also contrast the suggested "income tax" approach of taxing investments only when aggregate withdrawals exceed aggregate saved wages (i.e., a basis offset account without interest). See Andrews, supra
note 70. This approach fails to address the (i) current tax on inflationary gains, and (ii) the realization
distortion on saved wages. Increasing the saved wage account by inflation, rather than the higher riskfree rate, provides a more limited response to the wage realization issue than the hybrid approach. As a
related point, the hybrid approach has several advantages over asset-by-asset basis indexation. First,
basis indexation is more complex, as the basis on each separate asset must be separately adjusted for
inflation under a realization income tax. Second, it is likely that basis indexation would exclude debt (for
both the creditor and debtor) due to complexity concerns and political realities. Such "partial" indexation
allows tax arbitrage on debt-financed investments. See Engler, supra note 42, at 72-106. Third, the
realization significance for invested capital is reduced, but not eliminated as under the hybrid approach.
Finally, it provides a lesser response than the hybrid approach to the wage realization issue (the hybrid
approach consistently provides the risk-free rate of return). Cf. Engler, supra note 27, at 186-90 (under
certain assumptions, partial indexation adjusts at the short-term risk-free rate).
202.
See discussion supra notes 110-14 and accompanying text. As discussed therein, provisions may
limit this potential even in the first instance.
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mately may default on such deferred liability under the hybrid approach, the
realization income tax presents similar default possibilities in a broader
range of circumstances. 203 Also, consider the two ways in which the hybrid
approach might impose an excess burden on risky returns relative to the
cash flow tax. By taxing saved wages, the income tax, like the hybrid approach, imposes an excess burden where (i) portfolio adjustments require
borrowing at higher individual rates204 and/or (ii) wages are invested in loss
assets. 205
In sum, the hybrid approach would significantly improve various problem areas of current law, without the offsetting new concerns presented by
the cash flow tax.
V. CONCLUSION
Dissatisfaction with the current income tax system is increasing among
academics and government officials. Shifting to the most logical replacement, a consumption tax, raises several prominent questions. First, can a
consumption tax be designed with the progressivity necessary to satisfy the
desire for a redistributive tax system? Second, would the resulting progressive consumption tax appropriately balance the conflicting desires of consumption tax proponents to collect tax (i) without regard to savings decisions and (ii) based on standards of living? Third, would the resulting progressive consumption tax satisfy those favoring the income tax in theory but
frustrated by its long-standing practical problems? Finally, as a related matter, can the foregoing attributes be achieved without raising deep transition
concerns or other intractable issues?
The hybrid approach satisfactorily responds to all such inquiries. First,
the hybrid approach would achieve meaningful redistribution through its
dual progressivity burden on high wages and heavy consumption funded by
significant investment retums. 206 Second, the hybrid approach would successfully moderate between the savings neutrality and living standard desires, favoring each when most compelling. Third, the hybrid approach
should appeal even if one favors, in theory, the income tax's potential ex203.
See discussion supra note 118.
204.
Recall Example 2, discussed supra in Subpart II.A.
205.
The loss scenario differs somewhat for the hybrid and income taxes. As discussed above, the
issue under the hybrid approach arises where the portfolio return is less than the risk-free rate. In contrast, the issue arises under the income tax only for losses. On the other hand, the hybrid approach lessens the concern by providing an interest adjustment-through the basis offset account-on unused losses
that carry forward.
·
On balance, these potential burdens are generally considered undesirable, even by those commentators favoring an income tax in theory; they unfairly burden taxpayers with higher ·borrowing rates and/or
an inability to use tax losses. E.g., Deborah H. Schenk, Saving the Income Tax with a Wealth Tax, 53
TAX L. REv. 423,429 (2000) (discussing inability to use losses); Cunningham, supra note 38, at 35-39
(discussing excess borrowing rates). In any event, regardless of whether one ultimately favors these
burdens, they generally do not distinguish the income and hybrid taxes.
206.
This duality can appeal to someone favoring either a consumption tax or an income tax in theory. See discussion supra Subparts IV.F.1 and F.2.
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cess burden on the risk-free return. In practice, loopholes arising from this
attempted tax of the risk-free return allow well-advised taxpayers to avoid
tax not just on the risk-free return, but on other, more significant items as
well. The hybrid approach would relinquish the risk-free tax, which has
proven inequitable in practice, while strengthening the remaining, more
significant tax base. Finally, the hybrid approach's wage tax component
addresses the transition, revenue, and tax avoidance concerns that impede
the cash flow tax, the alternative progressive consumption tax.
In sum, the hybrid approach addresses both the deep structural flaws of
the current system as well as the most prominent cash flow tax concerns. As
shown above, the new hybrid approach combines significant substantive
benefits, consensus-forming potential, and relative transition ease. This new
hybrid structure, therefore, has real potential to break the current deadlock
between the status quo income tax and the conventional consumption tax.

